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I. INTRODUCTION
The antiquity of article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) has been delightfully delineated in the phrase that it is "old
wine in new bottles."' The term seems fitting since the wording of
the article was closely "cribbed" from the Negotiable Instruments
Law (NIL) which, in turn, was cribbed from the English Bills of
Exchange Act enacted in 1882.2 Essentially, the negotiable instru-
ments law of the United States became a closed system after the
adoption of the NIL. The American draftsmen of the UCC paid
little attention to the content of the 1930 Geneva Bills of Exchange
Convention" and the 1931 Geneva Check Convention,' and their
1. F. LEARY, JR., COMMERCIAL PAPER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 87 (1964).
2. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 61.
3. Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes,
June 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 259 (1933-34), reprinted in Register of Texts of Convention and
Other Instruments concerning International Trade Law, I U.N. GAOR, 154-80 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Geneva Draft Convention].
4. Convention Providing a Uniform Law for Cheques, March 19, 1931, 143 L.N.T.S. 357
(1933-34), reprinted in Register of Texts of Conventions and Other Instruments Concerning
International Trade Law, I U.N. GAOR 154-80 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Geneva Cheque
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subsequent adoptions, in whole or in part, in Europe and Latin
America. The "old wine" became domisticated wine which has not
improved with age.
Some fifty years after the Geneva Conventions, new conven-
tions governing drafts, promissory notes and checks have been pro-
posed under the auspices of the United Nations.5 These UN pro-
posed conventions are a blending of Anglo-American and civil law
(civilian) concepts with undue emphasis (in the opinion of the au-
thor) upon UCC concepts. This "undue emphasis" may have been
induced by hopes that the United States might adopt these con-
ventions. The author suggests that this "undue emphasis" may
have the opposite effect of turning away many of the civilian ori-
ented countries.
Regardless of the slant and over-all quality of these UN pro-
posed conventions, many of the proposed concepts (a large portion
of which can be tracked back to the Geneva Conventions) are
worth examining and comparing with the UCC. It is the objective
of this work to make comparisons of selected portions of the UCC
with the British Bills of Exchange Act, the UN Draft Convention
and UN Check Convention, the two Geneva Conventions6 and the
commercial codes and laws of Argentina, 7 Mexico,8 Venezuela,' El
Salvador,'0 Colombia,"' Guatemala"2 and Ecuador.'3
Convention].
5. Commentary on Draft Convention on International Bills of Exchange and Interna-
tional Promissory Notes, 15 U.N. GAOR commission on International Trade Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CN 9/213 (1982) (hereinafter cited as U.N. Draft Convention]; Commentary on Draft
Convention on International Cheques, 15 U.N. GAOR Commission on International Trade
Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN 9/214 (1982) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Check Convention].
6. In the discussion that follows, the author will use the terms Geneva Draft Conven-
tion, the English Bills of Exchange Act, etc., rather than their common abbreviations, in
order to facilitate the reader's comprehension and to avoid confusing the author who is
overwhelmed with abbreviations and acronyms.
7. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO DE ARGENTINA (F.A. Legon 9th ed. 1981). Bills of exchange are
governed by a separate decree having its own numbering system which appear as Title 10
and 11 in the C6DIGO. Checks are likewise governed by a separate decree which also has its
own numbering system. This decree appears as Title 13 in the C6DIGO. Any references here-
after will refer to the bill of exchange or check numbers.
8. Mexico includes bills of exchange and checks under a LEY GENERAL DE TITULOS Y
OPERACIONES DE CRIADITO (1981) [hereinafter cited as LaY GENERAL] with a separate number-
ing system from the Code of Commerce. The text of this Law is taken from CODIGO DE
COME.CIO Y LEYEs COMPLEMENTARIOS, (Colecci6n Porrta, 9th ed. 1983).
9. The Venezuelan law governing bills of exchange and checks is an integral part of the
Commercial Code. The text is taken from C6DIGo DE COMERCIO VENEZOLANO (A. HernAndez-
Bret6n 1982).
10. The El Salvadorian law governing bills of exchange and checks is an integral part of
the Commercial Code. The text has been taken from C6oIGo DE COMsRCO nE LA REPOBLICA
[Vol. 15:2
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There are some striking differences and similarities between
the Anglo-American and the civilian treatment of negotiable in-
struments. The striking differences are in the approaches to for-
gery of the drawer's signature, forgery of the payee's signature, cer-
tified checks, stop payment of checks, concepts of unjust
enrichment, the effect of the drawer's death or incompetency, con-
ditional endorsements, guaranty of instruments, crossed checks,
checks payable in account, the omission of the magic words "to the
order of" and a few other concepts which will be discussed in the
article. This article will also show some striking similarities be-
tween the two systems. After all, there are limited alternatives in
deciding a legal question, regardless of the differing legal systems,
languages, ethnic and social backgrounds and historical periods.
The author chose the above listed Latin American countries
because it is thought that they represent a fair cross-section of
South and Central America. Colombia, having at one time adopted
the negotiable instruments law of the United States, shows the
residual effects of this foreign infiltration in its commercial code.1'
The comparison of the laws of the various Latin American coun-
tries may help dispel the mistake which is commonly made in the
United States in thinking that the Latin American countries can
be lumped together as one homogeneous mass. In fact, these vari-
ous countries have diverse ideas, different ways of stating concepts
and differing legal vocabularies. There is an exciting diversity in
Latin American laws.
DE E SALVADOR (Ahora 1974).
11. The Colombian law governing bills of exchange and checks is an integral part of the
Commercial Code. It contains a continuous numbering of the articles. The text has been
taken from C6moo na Comxaclo (Jorge Ortega Tortes 1992).
12. The text of the Commercial Code (C6DIGO DE COMERCIO) may be found in CONSTI-
TUCI6N Y CODIGOS DE LA REPCjBLICA DE GUATEMALA (H.A. Cruz Quintana, 4th ed. 1975).
13. In Ecuador, bills of exchange are an integral part of the Commercial Code, whereas
checks are governed by a separate CODFICAC16N DE LA LEY DE CHEQUES (1972) [hereinafter
cited as LEY DE CHEQUES]. The bills of exchange articles in the Commercial Code have been
taken from 3 Leyes Tributarias 2-44-2-56 (1982); the Law of Checks is found in 4 Leyes
Tributarias 4-41-4-15 (1982).
14. The Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) of the United States was adopted in Co-
lombia by LEY 46 (1923), and it seemed to vanish as a separate chapter when the official
revision of the Commercial Code was promulgated in DEc. No. 410 and 837 (1971).
1983]
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II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Omission of the Magic Words "To The Order Of"
From law school days, it seems almost in the very order of
things that for any instrument to be negotiable it must contain the
magic words "to the order of" or "to bearer."'1 5 After so many gen-
erations of law school students have had this notion driven into
their heads, could it be possible to have negotiable instruments
simply payable to a named payee without the magic words? Could
a statute simply say that certain kinds of instruments are negotia-
ble by legislative fiat? As seen in section 8-105(1) of the UCC, it is
possible: "Certificated securities governed by this article are nego-
tiable instruments." So long as the security is issued in bearer or
registered form, is a share or other interest in property, is of a type
commonly traded on a security exchange or market and is divisible
into a series or class, it is negotiable.16 In short, all stocks and
bonds are now negotiable, even without the magic words, if they
are brought and sold on exchanges.
If stocks and bonds no longer need magic words of negotiabil-
ity, why not dispense with these words on promissory notes, checks
and drafts? Much of the rest of the world dispensed with the
magic words years ago. For example, England, the American source
of the magic words, has eliminated their necessity by providing
that:
A bill is payable to order which is expressed to be so payable, or
which is expressed to be payable to a particular person, and
does not contain words prohibiting transfer or indicating an in-
tention that it should not be transferable [emphasis added].1
Surely, if the English eliminated the necessity for the magic words
over a hundred years ago, it would seem that we, in the United
States, might do the same (particularly in light of the practice in
the rest of the world). The Geneva Draft Convention requires that
the bill of exchange state "[tihe name of the person to whom or to
whose order payment is to be made.'" This language is repeated
in the provisions governing promissory notes.' e
15. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(d), 3-110 (1977).
16. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a).
17. Bills of Exchange Act, § 8(4).
18. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 1(6).
19. Id., art. 75(5).
[Vol. 15:2
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The Geneva Check Convention is even more flexible:
A cheque may be made payable:
To a specified person with or without the express clause "to or-
der", or
To a specified person, with the words "not to order" or
equivalent words, or
To bearer.
A cheque made payable to a specified person with the words "or
to bearer", or any equivalent words, is deemed to be a cheque to
bearer.
A cheque which does not specify the payee is deemed to be a
cheque to bearer."'
The Geneva Check Convention then states that "a cheque made
payable to a specified person, with or without the express clause
'to order,' may be transferred by means of an indorsement."" If
the words "not to order" are used in the check, it can be trans-
ferred as an ordinary assignment.22 The Geneva Draft Convention
has a similar provision.
3
The UN Draft Convention states that a draft must be payable
"to the payee or his order." A promissory note must contain the
same language."4 The commentaries to these articles point out that
the UN Draft Convention does not permit drafts or promissory
notes to be drawn payable to bearer; however, the payee or special
indorsee may convert them into bearer instruments by indorsing
the instruments in blank.
2 5
The draftsmen of the UN Check Convention diverge from the
draftsmen of the Draft Convention by providing that the interna-
tional check may be made payable "to the payee or to his order or
to bearer. ''2 ' The draftsmen fail to articulate why they have au-
thorized a "bearer check." The commentary is limited to the magic
words "order of:"
The words "or to his order" have been added after the words "to
the payee" because of the well-established practice in certain
common law countries to draw cheques "to the order of" a
20. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 5.
21. Id., art. 14.
22. Id.
23. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 11.
24. U.N. Draft Convention, arts. 1(2)(b),(3)(b).
25. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 1 commentary at 8.
26. U.N. Check Convention, art. 1(2)(b).
1983]
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payee. However, the omission of the words "or to his order" does
not prevent the cheque from being a negotiable instrument
under this Convention. Therefore, an international cheque may
be drawn "pay to X," "pay to the order of X," "pay to X or to
his order," or "pay to bearer.""
This theme is continued in a commentary to another article of the
Check Convention:
Under article 1(2) of this Convention a cheque need not be
made payable to "the order" of the payee. Therefore, a mere
omission of the words "to order" does not prevent further trans-
fer, and where a cheque lacking that expression is transferred by
the payee in accordance with article 14 the transferee is a holder
and may in turn further transfer the cheque.m
El Salvador agrees with the UN Draft Convention that the
draft must be made payable to a payee and any draft written to
bearer is without effect,29 and the same rule prevails as to promis-
sory notes.80 Checks drawn in El Salvador must contain the "name
of the person in whose favor it is issued or indication that it is to
be to bearer."8 1 The El Salvadorian Commercial Code continues:
The check may be issued in:
I. A name of a determined person, which may be to the same
drawer or of a third party, and in both cases it shall be un-
derstood that it is to order.
II. In favor of a determined person, with the clause "not to the
order", "not negotiable" or other equivalent. If the benefi-
ciary was the same drawee, the check without exception
shall not be negotiable.
III. To bearer."
Under this El Salvadorian approach, the order language is not en-
tirely erased or disregarded. So long as the phrase "to order" is
understood, lip service is being used to perpetuate its use.
In Argentina, the bill of exchange must contain "[tihe name of
he to whom, or to whose order, the payment must be effectu-
27. Id., art. 1 commentary at 10.
28. Id., art. 18 commentary at 3.
29. C6DIGO DE ComERcIo, arts. 702 (VI), 705 (El Salvador).
30. Id., art. 788 (III).
31. Id., art. 793 (V).
32. Id., art. 797.
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ated." Further "[t]he bill of exchange is transmissible by way of
an indorsement even when it was not expressed to the order."'s
Ecuador agrees that a bill of exchange shall contain "[t]he
name of a person to whom or to whose order payment must be
effectuated,"3 and that "[a]ny bill of exchange even if it has not
been drawn expressly to order, is transmissible by way of an in-
dorsement." $ The Ecuadorian check law closely follows the Ge-
neva Check Convention. 7 Similar language is used in Venezuela
regarding bills of exchange," promissory notes89 and checks. 0
Mexico also adopts the view (as does El Salvador) that nomi-
native instruments shall always be understood as issued to order,
except when the clause "not to order or non-negotiable" is inserted
in the text or in the indorsement.4 1 So long as the instrument does
not contain the latter phrase, it can be transmitted by indorsement
and delivery.4 Guatemala shares the view with Mexico that instru-
ments issued to a determined person shall be presumed to be paya-
ble to order, and are transmissible by means of an indorsement
and delivery.' 8 On the other hand, "[t]he check may be to order or
to bearer. If it does not express the name of the beneficiary it shall
be reputed to bearer."
4
4
Of the seven Latin American countries surveyed in this article,
only Colombia requires that drafts and checks be made payable to
order or to bearer. The difference in the Colombian law can be
"blamed" on the influence of the United States.
4
5
B. Ambiguous Words and Numbers
The UCC states that "[wlords control figures except that if
the words are ambiguous figures control.' 4 Under this rule, if in a
33. C6DIoO DE ComERCIO, Titulo X, Cap. I, art. 6 (Argentina).
34. Id., Titulo X, Cap. II, art. 12.
35. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 410 (Ecuador).
36. Id., art. 419.
37. LEY DE CHEQUES, arts. 5, 13.
38. C6moo. nE Commco, Venezolano, arts. 410(2)(b), 419 (1965).
39. Id., arts. 486-87.
40. Id., arts. 490-91.
41. LEY GENERAL, art. 25.
42. Id., art. 26.
43. C6DIGO DE COMERClO DR GUATAMALA, art. 418 (1975).
44. Id., art. 497.
45. C6DIGO DR COaMRCio, arts. 671, 713 (Colombia).
46. U.C.C. § 3-118(c); Yates v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 432 So.2d 725 (Fla. 3rd
1983]
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promissory note the amount of the principal is written as Five
Hundred Thousand Dollars in one part and as Four Hundred
Thousand Dollars in another part and the figure $800,000.00 is
used in still another part, it would appear that the figure
($800,000.00) controls. What would happen in the suggested prob-
lem if the figures of $800,000.00 and $500,000.00 has been used
along with the words Five Hundred Thousand and Four Hundred
Thousand Dollars? The UCC would not seem to answer this prob-
lem, because it fails to indicate which "figures" control. The En-
glish rule that "[wJhere the sum payable is expressed in words and
also in figures, and there is a discrepancy between the two, the sum
denoted by the words is the amount payable" would also seem to
be of little help in solving the hypothetical problem."
7
The draftsmen of the Geneva Draft Convention foresaw the
hypothetical problem and provided the following answer:
Where the sum payable by a bill of exchange is expressed in
words and also in figures, and there is a discrepancy between the
two, the sum denoted by the words is the amount payable.
Where the sum payable by a bill of exchange is expressed more
than once in words or more than once in figures, and there is a
discrepancy, the smaller sum is the sum payable [emphasis
added]."'
Through an abundance of caution, a similar provision was
adopted in the Geneva Check Convention." Nevertheless, the form
check in use in much of the western world would seem to inhibit
the making of the kind of mistake outlined in the italacized word-
ing above. Mexico,50 Ecuador, 1 Colombia, 2 Venezuela,5 3 Argen-
tina,'4 Guatemala" and Colombia" all follow the substance of the
Geneva Draft Convention's provision.
In spite of the widespread adoption of the Geneva provision,
D.C.A. 1983).
47. Bills of Exchange Act, § 9-[2].
48. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 6.
49. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 9.
50. LEY GENERAL, art. 16.
51. CDIGo DE CoMERcio, art. 415 (Ecuador).
52. CODIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 415 (Colombia).
53. C6DIO0 DE COM cio, art. 415 (Venezuela).
54. C6DIGO Dr COMERCIO, Titulo X, Cap.I art. 6 (Argentina).
55. C6DIGO DE COMERCio, art. 388 (Guatemala).
56. C6DIO DE ComERcio, art. 623 (Colombia).
[Vol. 15:2
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the draftsmen of the UN Draft Convention have forgotten one-half
of the rule. The words "[i]f there is a discrepancy between the
amount of the instrument expressed in words and the amount ex-
pressed in figures, the amount of the instrument is the amount ex-
pressed in words" have been omitted from the Draft Convention .7
C. Agency
Under section 3-403 of the UCC, if an instrument is signed:
"Arthur Adams, agent," or
"Peter Pringle
Arthur Adams""
then Arthur Adams can use parol evidence to prove to the payee
that he has signed in a representative capacity. In that case, Ar-
thur Adams would not be personally liable on the instrument. If
Arthur Adams merely signs his name alone, then he cannot bring
in parol evidence, even against the payee or other immediate party
who may have full knowledge of Arthur Adams's agency status."
The UCC seems to be more protective of the alleged agent
than the English Bills of Exchange Act:
Personal liability of agent
(1) Where a person signs a bill as drawer, indorser, or ac-
ceptor, and adds words to his signature, indicating that he signs
for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative character,
he is not personally liable thereon; but the mere addition to his
signature of words describing him as an agent, or as filling a rep-
resentative character, does not exempt him from personal
liability.
(2) In determining whether a signature on a bill is that of
the principal; or that of an agent by whose hand it is written,
the construction most favorable to the validity of the instrument
shall be adopted."
Under this section of the act, it would appear that if the name of a
corporation is typed or printed on an instrument and one or more
individuals signs his name followed by the word "Director," it is
merely an indication that the signer is "filling a representative
57. U.N. Draft Convention art. 7(1).
58. U.C.C. § 3-403 comment 3.
59. Id.
60. Bills of Exchange Act, § 26.
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character."'" This alone would not be enough to absolve him from
personal liability.
The Geneva Draft Convention and the Geneva Check Conven-
tion are both overly succinct regarding the agency question:
Whosoever puts his signature on a bill of exchange as represent-
ing a person for whom he had no power to act is bound himself
as to a party to the bill and, if he pays, has the same rights as
the person for whom he purported to act. The same rule applies
to a representative who has exceeded his powers.62
The UCC follows the same rule by making the unauthorized agent
personally liable on the instrument."
Latin American law relating to ambiguous agency signatures
seems relatively undeveloped. In Mexico, for example:
He that accepts, certifies, draws, issues, emits, indorses or by
any other concept subscribes a credit instrument in the name of
another, without sufficient power or without legal power to do
so, is obligated personally as if he had operated in his own name,
and if he pays, he acquires the same rights which correspond to
the person represented.".
The same article points out that the unauthorized signature of the
purported agent may be ratified by the alleged principal. A subse-
quent article provides that the alleged principal, by his acts or
omissions may be precluded from asserting lack of authority of the
alleged agent.15 There seems, however, to be no provision gov-
erning ambiguous signatures. The Guatemalan law closely resem-
bles the Mexican law on this point.66
El Salvadorian signers who do not have the power to act as an
agent or who exceed their powers as an authorized agent are con-
sidered personally liable. In El Salvador also, nothing is said about
the ambiguous signature.67 Colombia follows a similar view,68 but
recognizes (in a fashion similar to the Mexican law) that the al-
leged principal may be precluded from asserting lack of authority
of the agent if the principal's acts or omissions have misled a third
61. Elliot v. Bax-Ironside [1925] 2 K.B. 301.
62. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 8; Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 11.
63. U.C.C. § 3-404.
64. LEY GENEiRAL, art. 10.
65. Id., art. 11.
66. C6DIGo DE COMERCto, art. 406 (Guatemala).
67. C6D1GO DE COMERC1O, art. 417 (El Salvador).
68. C6DIoo DE COMERCO, art. 642 (Colombia).
[Vol. 15:2
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party." Here, again, there is no treatment of the ambiguous signer.
Argentina also binds the unauthorized agent personally, and
fails to deal with the ambiguity problem. In addition, the Argen-
tine law concentrates on the kind of mandate that must be given to
the agent.70 Venezuela follows a rule similar to those outlined
above.7 1 The Ecuadorian code provision resembles (with a slight
change in language) the Geneva Draft and Check Conventions."
Article 32 of the UN Draft Convention and article 34 of the
UN Check Convention"3 appear to be a blend of the U.S. and civil-
ian concepts with a slight tilting towards the civilian approach.
Under paragraph 2 of both conventions, if Arthur Adams signs a
draft, note or check as "Arthur Adams, as agent for Peter Pringle,"
and Peter Pringle has authorized this act, Pringle is liable and Ar-
thur Adams has no liability. If Arthur Adams signs Peter Pringle's
name (with authority) and then adds "by Arthur Adams," the
same result holds true. Finally, if Arthur Adams merely signs Peter
Pringle's name, with Peter Pringle's authority, the result again is
the same.
Under paragraph 3 of both articles, if Arthur Adams signs
without authority or in excess of his authority, he is personally 1ia-
69. Id., art. 640.
70. C6DIGO De COMRCIO, Titulo X, Cap. I, arts. 8, 9 (Argentina).
71. C6DIco DE CosgRc1o, art. 417 (Venezuela).
72. C6DIGo DE COMERico, art. 417 (Ecuador).
73. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 32 reads,
(1) An instrument may be signed by an agent.
(2) The signature of an agent placed by him on an instrument with the authority
of his principal and showing on the instrument that he is signing in a represen-
tative capacity for that named principal, or the signature of a principal placed
on the instrument by an agent with his authority imposes liability on the princi-
pal and not on the agent.
(3) A signature placed on an instrument by a person as agent but without au-
thority to sign or exceeding his authority, or by an agent with authority to sign
but not showing on the instrument that he is signing in a representative capacity
for a named person, or showing on the instrument that he is signing in a repre-
sentative capacity but not naming the person whom he represents, imposes lia-
bility thereon on the person signing and not on the person whom he purports to
represent.
(4) The question whether a signature was placed on the instrument in a repre-
sentative capacity may be determined only by reference to what appears on the
instrument.
(5) A person who is liable pursuant to paragraph (3) and who pays the instru-
ment has the same rights as the person for whom he purported to act would
have had if that person had paid the instrument.
Article 34 of the U.N. Check Convention uses the same wording, except the word "cheque"
is substituted for the word "instrument."
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ble. This, of course, is consistent with the rule in Anglo-American
and civilian countries. The same paragraph also covers cases where
the agent is authorized but signs in an ambiguous fashion. For ex-
ample, if Arthur Adams signs his name merely as "Arthur Adams,"
or signs his name as "Arthur Adams, agent," without writing the
name of the principal, then, in both cases Arthur Adams is person-
ally liable. In the first case, Arthur Adams is liable because he has
not indicated his agency status. In the second case liability occurs
because he has failed to indicate the name of the principal, even
though he has indicated that he is acting as an "agent." The com-
mentary to paragraph 4 of article 32 of the Draft Convention
clearly outlaws the use of any parol evidence to establish the name
of the principal:
In the above cases where an agent signs with authority, it is
important to determine whether or not he has acted in a repre-
sentative capacity. Paragraph (4) emphasizes that such determi-
nation may be made only by what appears ex facie the instru-
ment and not by any circumstances outside the instrument.
Example. A places his signature under a stamp of X Corpora-
tion which appears at the place where usually the signature of
the drawer appears. The question whether A signed as an agent
for X Corporation or as a co-drawer must be decided on the ba-
sis of what appears on the instrument (e.g. the distance between
stamp and signature may be relevant) but not on the basis of
evidence extrinsic to the instrument (e.g. the fact that A is di-
rector of X Corporation).
6. Since the only relevant factor is what appears ex facie the
instrument, it is immaterial whether or not the holder had
knowledge of the agent's authority or of his acting as agent. Fur-
thermore, the above rules apply even if the holder is a protected
holder.
7 '
D. Burden of Proof - Holder in Due Course Status
There are two separate notions of burden of proof. These are
the burden of coming forward with evidence at a trial and the bur-
den of pursuading the tier of fact to find one way or the other on a
disputed point. These two notions can be difficult to separate. The
problem of separating these notions is even more difficult when
74. U.N. Check Convention commentary at 5, 6.
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dealing with comparative law and burdens of proof in negotiable
instruments.
The Geneva Check and Draft Conventions delicately skirt the
issue by saying that the possessor of an indorsable check or instru-
ment is deemed to be the lawful holder if he establishes his title
through an uninterrupted series of indorsements. The possessor,
however, would have to give up the check or instrument if he/she
acquired it in bad faith or if in acquiring it he/she had been guilty
of gross negligence . The phrase "is deemed" would seem to indi-
cate that there is a rebuttable presumption that the possessor is a
holder in due course, but that the presumption can be rebutted by
proof of bad faith or gross negligence. The question of who has to
sustain or overcome this presumption is, however, not answered.
The English Bill of Exchange Act states that:
every holder of a bill is prima facie deemed to be a holder in due
course; but if in an action on a bill it is admitted or proved that
the acceptance, issue, or subsequent negotiation of the bill is af-
fected with fraud, duress, or force and fear, or illegality, the bur-
den of proof is shifted, unless and until the holder proves that,
subsequent to the alleged fraud or illegality, value has in good
faith been given for the bill.76
It would appear that the words "it is admitted or proved"
mean simply that if there is sufficient evidence of defenses for a
jury to consider, then the defense is "proved." Further, it would
appear that after this defense is proved, the holder has the burden
of proving good faith and the giving of value, while the defendant
has the burden of proving that the holder took with knowledge of
the defense.
77
Under the UCC, when signatures are either admitted or
proved to be genuine, the holder is entitled to recover, unless the
defendant proves a defense (such as fraud, consideration failing in
whole or in part, etc.,). The holder must then prove that he/she is
a holder in due course (in that he/she took for value, in good faith
and without knowledge)."' In short, the holder in the United States
is presumed to be a holder in due course. This presumption can
only be rebutted if the defendant proves a defense. The burden
75. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 16; Geneva Cheque Convention, arts. 19, 21.
76. Bills of Exchange Act, § 30(2).
77. BYLES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 208 (23rd ed. 1972).
78. U.C.C. § 3-307, 3-302.
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then shifts back to the holder to prove his due course standing. It
would appear that a holder in England must simply prove value
(consideration) and good faith while his United States counterpart
must prove value, good faith and lack of knowledge.
The UN Check and Draft Conventions have turned things up-
side down by providing that: "[e]very holder is presumed to be a
protected holder, unless the contrary is proved." 9 The single com-
mentary to these articles breathes some life into the word "pre-
sumed" by stating:
If a person is the holder of a cheque it is presumed that he is a
protected holder. Therefore, if, in an action by the holder of the
cheque against a party liable to him, such party brings a claim
to the cheque or raises a deference against his liability, it is for
the party bringing the claim or raising the defence to prove that
the holder is not a protected holder.
In order to prove that the holder is not a protected holder, the
defendant will have to prove either that the holder took with
knowledge of a claim or defense, 80 that he knew the instrument
had been dishonored by nonpayment, that the instrument was not
complete and regular on its face when he took it, or that the time
limit for presentment had expired. 81 In the vast majority of cases,
all of these facts will be known only to the holder. For example, a
maker or drawer may assert that the instrument was incomplete
when it left his/her hands and that the holder took it when it was
incomplete. The holder can then testify that although the instru-
ment may have been issued while incomplete, it was complete and
regular on its face when he/she took it. Proving a negative is a
most difficult task.
This concept of "knowledge" becomes very tricky when the
two conventions' definition of knowledge is considered: "[flor the
purposes of this convention, a person is considered to have knowl-
edge of a fact if he has actual knowledge of that fact or could not
have been unaware of its existence." 82 The single commentary to
these two sections notes that "[u]nder this article the concept of
'knowledge' covers (a) actual knowledge of a fact and (b) construc-
tive knowledge, i.e., the person could not have been unaware of the
79. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 28, U.N. Check Convention, art. 30.
80. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 4(7); U.N. Check Convention, art. 6(6).
81. Id.
82. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 5; U.N. Check Convention, art. 7.
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existence of a fact." This "constructive knowledge" aspect bears a
startling similarity to the UCC language that a person has notice of
a fact when "from all the facts and circumstances known to him at
the time in question he has reason to know that it exists."8 It
therefore appears, under either the UN or UCC version that, if it is
proved that a holder has knowledge of facts A, B, and C and the
totality of these three facts leads to the conclusion that fact D ex-
ists, then a court would find knowledge of fact D.
The UN Check and Draft Conventions in their definition of a
"protected holder" have ignored the concepts of good faith and
consideration. A commentary" to article 6 of the Check Conven-
tion and a comment" to article 4 of the Draft Convention note
that:
A person may be a protected holder even though he has not
given value or consideration for the instrument. This rule is con-
sistent with some legal systems, notably those of civil law inspi-
ration, and departs from others (e.g. BEA Section 29(1), and
UCC sections 3-302(1) (a) and 3-303). The present approach was
selected because of the problems of unifying the different ap-
proaches to the relevance of "value" or "consideration" by legal
systems.
Dispensing with the need for value was wise because although
most truly commercial transactions involving negotiable instru-
ments will involve consideration (which would also be sufficient
"cause" under the civil systems) the occasional gift transaction
might be valid under the civilian systems but fail under the Anglo-
American systems. The cause of unification is too important to sac-
rifice to uphold a peculiarity of Anglo-American law.
On the other hand, both conventions have seemingly eradi-
cated any good faith notion. While it is true that under the defini-
tions of "knowledge," the draftsmen in both conventions" have in-
cluded a citation to section 1-201(19) of the UCC which defines
good faith, nothing in the text of the convention or commentary
talks about good faith. The same commentary refers to sections 21
and 22 of the Geneva Check Convention and sections 16 and 17 of
83. U.C.C. § 1-201 (25)(c). The Seventh Circuit recognized this constructive notice rule
in Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank of Eldorado, 582 F.2d 424, 431, 24 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 1251 (7th Cir. 1978).
84. U.N. Check Convention, art 6 commentary at 17.
85. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 4 commentary at 17.
86. U.N. Check Convention, art. 7; U.N. Draft Convention, art. 5.
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the Geneva Draft Convention. These sections uniformly state that
the possessor of a disposed instrument will be forced to give it up
if he takes the instrument in bad faith or with gross negligence.
The same sections also state that a party can set up defenses
against a holder who knowingly acts to the detriment of the
debtor. As will be discussed in a subsequent section of this article,
the Latin American Countries have generally followed the bad
faith and gross negligence concepts.87 It is strange that the com-
mentary to each convention is silent about the discarding of such a
uniform legal notion. There may well be good reasons for discard-
ing this bad faith concept, such as for the sake of speed and ease of
negotiation and for the possibility that this might aid in the adop-
tion of these conventions. The absence of any justification, how-
ever, seems counter-productive.
E. How Does One Count the Elapsing of Time?
Assume that a promissory note is issued payable one year
from date, and that date is January 6, 1983; how does one deter-
mine the due date? The standard way in the United States is to
exclude January 6, 1983, and to start counting from January 7,
1983. By adding 365 days, the maturity date arrived at is January
6, 1984 (the date of payment is included).28 If the instrument has
any other fixed number of days then the same process is repeated.
But, assume that a note is payable one or two months from date,
then how does one count when there are months with varying
days? The UCC is silent on this problem.
Assume a further problem: the instrument is drawn in Rome,
Italy, and payable in Lima, Peru, two months after date. How does
one calculate the day of maturity when different time zones are
involved? Again, the UCC is silent. The English Bills of Exchange
Act seems content to say that the "Term 'month' in a bill means
calendar month."89 This may be helpful if the instrument is issued
on the first day of a month, but what happens when the instru-
ment is issued on January 25, 1983? How does one compute in
light of the varying days in February and March?
Most of the problems posed above are nicely answered in two
sections of the Geneva Draft Convention. Article 36 states:
87. See infra text accompanying note 220.
88. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AcT (N.I.L.), § 86 (1896).
89. Bills of Exchange Act, § 14(4).
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Where a bill of exchange is drawn at one or more months
after date or after sight, the bill matures on the corresponding
date of the month when payment must be made. If there be no
corresponding date, the bill matures on the last day of this
month.
When a bill of exchange is drawn at one or more months
and a-half after date or sight, entire months must first be
calculated.
If the maturity is fixed at the commencement, in the middle
(mid-January or mid-February, etc.) or at the end of the month,
the first, fifteenth or last day of the month is to be understood.
The expressions "eight days" or "fifteen days" indicate not
one or two weeks, but a period of eight or fifteen actual days.
The expression "half-month" means a period of fifteen
days.
Under the first clause, it would appear that if a note is issued
on January 29, 1983, payable one month from date, then the note
is payable on February 28, 1983. The definition of "half-month" as
consisting of fifteen days nicely solves the problem of twenty-eight
and thirty-one day months. The problem of different calendar
zones is handled well in article 37:
When a bill of exchange is payable on a fixed day in a place
where the calendar is different from the calendar in the place of
issue, the day of maturity is deemed to be fixed according to the
calendar of the place of payment.
When a bill of exchange drawn between two places having
different calendars is payable at a fixed period after date, the
day of issue is referred to the corresponding day of the calendar
in the place of payment, and the maturity is fixed accordingly.
The time for presenting bills of exchange is calculated in
accordance with the rules of the preceding paragraph.
These rules do not apply if a stipulation in the bill or even
the simple terms of the instrument indicate an intention to
adopt some different rule.
The draftsmen of the UN Draft Convention have chosen to
deal with the time problem in a most disappointing, overly suc-
cinct manner:
Where an instrument is drawn, or made, payable at one or
more months after a stated date or after the date of the instru-
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ment or after sight, the instrument matures on the correspond-
ing date of the month when payment must be made. If there is
no corresponding date, the instrument matures on the last day
of that month.90
In spite of the international character of the UN Draft Convention,
nothing is stated as to how to measure dates in different calendar
zones, etc. This lack of attention seems strange in light of the ap-
proach used in modern legislation in Latin America. For example,
the Geneva Draft Convention rules are adopted in Argentina."
Guatemala follows the Geneva time rules for drafts drawn and
payable in Guatemala, but seemingly omits any reference to the
problem of different calendars." Article 36 of the Geneva Conven-
tion has also been adopted in Mexico. El Salvador has adopted
article 36 of the Geneva Convention and the second paragraph of
article 37.9 Articles 36 and 37 are also in effect in Venezuela 5 and
Ecuador," while a portion of article 36 is in effect in Colombia.
9 7
F. The Holder in Due Course and the Time for Presentment
of a Demand Draft of Promissory Note
The UCC states that the purchaser of a demand instrument
has notice that it is overdue when he takes it after "more than a
reasonable length of time after its issue."'98 Under the English Bills
of Exchange Act, a demand bill is deemed to be overdue "when it
appears on the face of it to have been in circulation for an unrea-
sonable length of time. What is an unreasonable length of time for
this purpose is a question of fact."" The UCC further states that
presentment must be made within a reasonable time in order to
preserve the liability of secondary parties. 0 0 A reasonable time in
that case is "determined by the nature of the instrument, any us-
age of banking or trade and the facts of the particular case."' 0 '
90. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 8(8).
91. C6DIGO DE ComERcio, Titulo X, Cap. V, arts. 38, 39 (Argentina).
92. CODIGO DE COMERCIO, arts. 944-46 (Guatemala).
93. LEY GENERAL, art. 80.
94. C6DIGo D CoMmKcIo, arts, 707, 637 (El Salvador).
95. C6DIGO DE COMERCIo, arts. 444-45 (Venezuela).
96. C6DIGo DE COMERCIO, arts. 444-45 (Ecuador).
97. C6DIOo DE CONERCio, arts. 674-75 (Colombia).
98. U.C.C. § 3-304(3)(c).
99. Bills of Exchange Act, § 36(3).
100. U.C.C. §§ 3-501, 3-502.
101. Id., § 3-502(2).
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The Anglo-American approach is consistent with the notion of
a reasonable time as the standard; this approach is the direct op-
posite of the civilian approach of certainty. Under the Geneva
Draft Convention, demand on the demand draft'02 and the de-
mand note 0 3 must be made within one year of its date. Any in-
dorsement after that date amounts to an assignment.'" This one-
year rule is preserved in the UN Draft Convention.' 0
The one-year rule is followed in Colombia,"' Argentina'" and
Guatemala,10 8 but any of the obligated parties may reduce this pe-
riod by a notation on the bill. In Mexico,'0 9 a demand draft is pay-
able within six months from its date, and, like Colombia, any of
the obligated parties may reduce this term by noting the reduction
on the draft. In El Salvador, demand drafts must be presented
within one year of date. 1 Ecuador11 and Venezuela 12 tie the ac-
ceptance and payment concepts together by stating that demand
instruments must be presented for payment within the time fixed
for the presentment of drafts payable at a certain time after sight.
That time is fixed at six months after the date of issuance. 11
Whether a country follows the one-year rule of the Geneva
and UN Conventions or the six-month rule of some of the Latin
American countries, the potential holder knows that he must
purchase before the expiration of the period in order to be an in-
dorsee rather than an assignee. In addition, once he becomes a
holder he has a fixed period within which to present for payment.
The Anglo-American potential holder has to pray that his concep-
tion of a reasonable time will meet with judicial approbation after
he has purchased the instrument and some defendant has attacked
his holder in due course status.
102. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 34.
103. Id., art. 77.
104. Id., art. 20.
105. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 51(f).
106. C6DIGO DE ComERCio, art. 692 (Colombia).
107. C6DIo DE ComEacio, Titulo X, Cap. V, art. 36 (Argentina).
108. C6nIoo DE Comz~RcIo, art. 464 (Guatemala).
109. LEY GENERAL, art. 128.
110. C6vIGo DE COM.Rcio, art. 734 (El Salvador).
111. C6MIo DE ComRscio, arts. 430, 442 (Ecuador).
112. C6nDIo DE CoMwacIo, arts. 431, 442 (Venezuela).
113. Id., art. 431.
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G. Prohibition of Further Indorsements
Under the UCC, "no restrictive indorsement prevents further
transfer or negotiation of the instrument."1 " A comment to this
section115 points out that a signature such as "Pay A only," is inef-
fective to prevent A from negotiating or transferring the instru-
ment to another. Takers from A and subsequent holders would not
be put on notice that something was wrong by virtue of this kind
of indorsement. The same comment points out that this kind of
indorsement is rare in American practice. The author is puzzled as
to why rarity of use should lead to the prohibition of use.
Under the English Bills of Exchange Act:
An indorsement is restrictive which prohibits the further
negotiation of the bill ... as, for example, if a bill be indorsed
"Pay D only," . . . . (2) A restrictive indorsement gives the in-
dorsee the right to receive payment of the bill and to sue any
party thereto that his indorser could have sued, but gives him
no power to transfer his rights as indorsee unless it expressly
authorizes him to do so [emphasis added]. 1 6
It seems clear that an indorsement "Pay D only" would have the
opposite effect in England from the effect it would have in the
United States.
In accordance with the English Bills of Exchange Act, the Ge-
neva Draft' 7 and Check 1 8 Conventions state that an indorser
"may prohibit any further endorsement; in this case, he gives no
guarantee to the persons to whom the bill [cheque] is subsequently
endorsed." The Ecuadorian Commercial Code closely replicates
this language in its bill of exchange provisions 19 as well as in its
check provisions.120 Similarly, the Argentine indorser of a draft or
a check 128 may prohibit further indorsements, and will not be re-
sponsible to subsequent indorsees. Venezuela is in accord as to
drafts' and checks.' In Guatemala, any holder of a check "may
114. U.C.C. § 3-206(1).
115. Id., comment 2.
116. Bills of Exchange Act, § 35.
117. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 15.
118. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 18.
119. C6DIGO DE CoMFacIO, art. 423 (Ecuador).
120. LEY DE CHEQUES, art. 17.
121. C6DIGo DE Cammcio, Titulo XII, Cap. II, art. 16 (Argentina).
122. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 423 (Venezuela).
123. Id., art. 491.
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limit its negotiability, by stamping on the document the clause:
"not negotiable."' 4 The Guatemalan law does not seem to give the
indorsee any other way of restricting transfer.
The UN Draft 2 6 and Check Conventions 126 seemingly dupli-
cate the above stated Guatemalan provision along with the English
Bills of Exchange Act and the Geneva Conventions on Drafts and
Checks:
When the drawer or the maker has inserted in the instrument,
or an endorser in his endorsement [emphasis added], such
words as "not negotiable," "not transferable," "not to order,"
"pay (X) only," or words of similar import, the transferee does
not become a holder except for purposes of collection.
The commentaries to these two sections point out that the indorser
has to put this limiting language in his/her indorsement. An indor-
see under the above forms can not transfer the instrument even for
the very limited purpose of collection. He/she has to collect di-
rectly from the drawee.
127
H. Conditional Indorsements
The area of conditional indorsements is one of the most diver-
gent ones, with the American view upholding them and the civilian
and English view to the extreme opposite. Under the UCC, an in-
dorsement may be conditional. For example, a payee can indorse a
note or draft: "Pay to John Jones upon condition that he conveys
Blackacre to me, /s/ Patrick Payee." Any taker from John Jones
(except an intermediary bank) has to make sure that he is acting
consistently with the indorsement and, to the extent that he is, can
be a holder in due course." 8
The English Bill of Exchange Act states that "[w]here a bill
purports to be indorsed conditionally the condition may be disre-
garded by the payer, and payment to the indorsee is valid whether
the condition has been fulfilled or not. ''2  The same provision
124. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 498 (Guatemala).
125. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 16.
126. U.N. Check Convention, art. 18. The word "cheque" is substituted for the word
"instrument;" the article speaks to the "drawer of a cheque payable to a payee or to his
order ......
127. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 16 commentary at 2; U.N. Check Convention, art. 18
commentary at 2.
128. U.C.C. §§ 2-205, 3-206.
129. Bills of Exchange Act, § 33.
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would seem applicable to indorsements on checks.18
Both the Geneva Check Convention'' and the Geneva Draft
Convention8 " state that "[a]n endorsement must be uncondi-
tional." Any written conditions are to be disregarded and are
deemed not written.
The UN Check Convention repeats the language that "[a]n
endorsement must be unconditional," and then adds that "[a] con-
ditional endorsement transfers the cheque whether or not the con-
dition is fulfilled."'8 3 Article 17 of the UN Draft Convention tracks
the same language as the Check Convention.
Guatemala, 8" Argentina, 85 Venezuela,' 36 El Salvador,3 7 Mex-
ico,138 Ecuador139 and Colombia"10 all agree that indorsements
must be unconditional. Fortunately, or unfortunately, inasmuch as
conditional indorsements are rarely utilized in practice in the
United States, this lack of uniformity between the United States
and the Anglo-civilian world may be of little consequence.
L Conditional and Qualified Acceptances
The UCC authorizes "conditional acceptances, acceptances
for part of the amount [emphasis added], acceptances to pay at a
different time from that required by the draft, or the acceptance of
less than all of the drawees.1"''  While section 3-412 does not ex-
pressly mention the term "conditional acceptance," the English
Bills of Exchange Act expressly states that "[in particular an ac-
ceptance is qualified which is-(a) Conditional, that is to say,
which makes payment by the acceptor dependent on the fulfill-
ment of a condition therein stated.'
4 2
This Anglo-American view is not shared by the civilian coun-
130. Id., § 73.
131. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 15.
132. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 12.
133. U.N. Check Convention, art. 19.
134. C6DIGO DR ComzRcio, art. 423 (Guatemala).
135. C6DIGO DR CouuRcio, Titulo X, Cap. II, art. 13 (Argentina).
136. C6Do Dn ComEacio, art. 420 (Venezuela).
137. C6DXo DR Couiacio, art. 664 (El Salvador).
138. Liv GENERAL, art. 31.
139. C6nIoo DR CorERcio, art. 420 (Ecuador).
140. CODIo DR CoMzRcio, art. 655 (Colombia).
141. U.C.C. § 3-412 comment 1.
142. Bills of Exchange Act, § 19(2)(a).
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tries. For example, the Geneva Draft Convention provides that an
"acceptance is unconditional, but the drawee may restrict it to part
of the sum payable. Every other modification introduced by an ac-
ceptance into the tenor of the bill of exchange operates as a refusal
to accept. Nevertheless, the acceptor is bound according to the
terms of his acceptance."14 Only a lawyer can appreciate how
something can be a refusal and an acceptance at the same time.
Argentina has adopted most of the Geneva Draft Convention
language regarding acceptances. It does, however, disallow the use
of conditional acceptances by its use of a phrase which is common
in Latin America: "[t]he acceptance must be pure and simple; the
drawee may limit it to a part of the amount."1" Venezuela also
follows the "pure and simple" language. 4 5 Mexico tracks the Ge-
neva language, " a and Guatemala,14 7 Colombia,1' 8 Ecuador 49 and
El Salvador' 50 are in accord, although there are some changes in
language.
The approach of the UN Draft Convention is again to disallow
the conditional acceptance:
(1) An acceptance must be unqualified. An acceptance is quali-
fied if it is conditional or varies the terms of the bill.
(2) If the drawee stipulates on the bill that his acceptance is
subject to qualification:
(a) He is nevertheless bound according to the terms of his
qualified acceptance;
(b) The bill is dishonored by non-acceptance.
(3) An acceptance relating to only a part of the amount of the
bill is a qualified acceptance. If the holder takes such an accept-
ance, the bill is dishonoured by non-acceptance only as to the
remaining part. 5'
A commentary to this article notes that "[i]f the holder takes the
qualified acceptance and does not protest the dishonour he has
rights against the acceptor under the qualified acceptance but par-
143. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 26.
144. C6DIGO DE ComERcIo, Titulo X, Cap. III, art. 28 (Argentina).
145. C6DIGO DE CoMERcIo, art. 434 (Venezuela).
146. LEY GENERAL, art. 99.
147. C6DIGo DE CoMEmcio, art. 459 (Guatemala).
148. C6DIO DE COMERCIO, art. 687 (Colombia).
149. C6DIGO DE CoMERcIO, art. 434 (Ecuador).
150. C6DIGO DE CoMERcio, art. 722 (El Salvador).
151. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 39.
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ties secondarily liable to the holder are not liable.' 52 In effect, this
commentary is stating that the qualified acceptance does not re-
lieve the drawer and indorsers unless the holder fails to protest the
dishonor of the bill for the unaccepted amount. This is the direct
antithesis of the UCC which states that where "the holder assents
to an acceptance varying the terms of the draft each drawer and
indorser who does not affirmatively assent is discharged."'
Under the English Bills of Exchange Act, when domestic bills
are accepted for less than the face amount, indorsers and drawers
must dissent within a reasonable time after they have received no-
tice of the qualified acceptance or they shall be deemed to have
assented to the qualified acceptance. If, however, a foreign bill is
involved, and there is an acceptance for less than the full face
amount, "it must be protested as to the balance." 1 In brief, the
English law simply accommodates the civilian practice of holding
drawers and indorsers liable for the unaccepted balance of the
draft if a protest for its dishonor is made.
Argentina,15 5 El Salvador,"' Venezuela 57 and Mexico " seem
to follow the rule that the drawer and indorsers remain liable in
the event of an acceptance for part of the face amount, if a protest
is made. Again, the Anglo-American position is an isolated one, but
even the English have made an accommodation for the foreign
position.
J. Alterations
In the United States, if a drawee-bank pays a completed check
which has been altered as to the amount, the drawer may recover
the increased amount from the bank because the check, as altered,
is not properly payable. 15' Of course, if the drawer's negligence has
substantially contributed to the making of the alteration, the bank
has a defense.1 60 Further, the bank may have a "delay defense" if
the drawer fails to inform the bank of the alteration in a timely
152. Id., commentary at 2.
153. U.C.C. § 3-412(3).
154. Bills of Exchange Act, § 44(2).
155. C6ioo DZ Comacio, Titulo X, Cap. VII, art. 47(a)-(b)(3) (Argentina).
156. C6DIGO DR Comancio, arts. 752, 766 (El Salvador).
157. C6DIGo D9 Cosancio, art. 459 (Venezuela).
158. LEY GizaNsAL, arts. 139, 150-69.




fashion.'61 In general, however, most alteration losses fall upon the
payor-bank.
In England, the payor-bank will normally be liable for any al-
teration increasing the amount of the check. The bank may be able
to avoid the loss if it can show that its customer's negligence is the
cause of the loss.'62 The English approach is entirely decisional;
neither the Bill of Exchange Act nor the English Cheque Act of
1957 deals with the problem.
In the case of an incomplete check, both the United States'"
and England '" protect the holder in due course who has taken the
check after its unauthorized completion, or its completion in excess
of the authority given by the drawer. In that instance, however,
England protests the holder only if the instrument has been is-
sued. The good faith drawee-payor is also protected in the United
States.
1 65
Both England' 6 and the United States'67 agree that a holder
in due course of a completed check which has been altered may
enforce it according to its original tenor. When it comes to the
question of the rights of successive indorsers, the terminology, if
not the result, changes. In the United States, each indorser war-
rants to his indorser that the instrument has not been materially
altered."6 In England, the indorser "engages that on due present-
ment it shall be. . .paid according to its tenour. . . ."61 In brief,
the American indorser's liability is based upon a warranty by oper-
ation of law that the instrument has not been increased in amount,
while in England the indorser engages (promises) that he will pay
to his indorsee the amount which appears on the face of the check.
Different terminology is used, but with similar results.
The UN Check Convention seemingly has not attempted to
legislate the liability of payor-banks .for paying altered checks.
This approach follows the earlier Geneva Check Convention. Both
conventions agree with the basic notion that in the case of an alter-
161. U.C.C. § 4-406.
162. E.g. Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (1827); London Joint Stock
Bank v. McMillan, 1918 A.C. 777.
163. U.C.C. § 3-407.
164. Bills of Exchange Act, § 20.
165. U.C.C. § 3-407.
166. Bills of Exchange Act, § 64.
167. U.C.C. § 3-407(2)(b).
168. Id., § 3-417(2)(c).
169. Bills of Exchange Act, § 55(2)(a).
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ation of a check, parties who sign subsequent to the alteration are
bound in accordance with the terms of the altered text, and parties
who sign before the alteration are bound in accordance with the
original text.170 A similar provision is found in the Geneva Bill of
Exchange Convention. 17  The UN Draft Convention adds that
"[flailing proof to the contrary, a signature is deemed to have been
placed on the cheque after the material alteration.1 172 A commen-
tary points out that:
It should be noted that the rule on material alteration laid down
in article 33 deals only with the liability on the cheque. It does
not prevent a person who has suffered loss because of the altera-
tion to claim damages under national law, for example from a
drawer who facilitated the alteration by leaving open a space
which enabled the payee to alter the figure and wording of the
sunj without it being apparent. 3
The civilian approach to the question of liability of the payor-
bank to its customers for altered checks differs from the general
rule in the United States and England. For example, in Guatemala,
the drawer may not complain to his payor-bank about an altera-
tion if it occurs through his own fault or the fault of his agents,
representatives or clerks.' 7" Further, if the alteration is made on
blank checks given by the bank, or approved by it, then the drawer
customer may object only when the alteration is obvious or if op-
portune notice of the alteration is given to the bank. "Any cove-
nant contrary to that disposed in this article is null."' 7 The Mexi-
can alteration provisions follow (with some change in wording) the
same concepts as Guatemala.1
7
Banks in El Salvador, which pay forged checks, suffer the con-
sequences "[ihf the check exhibits signs of alteration.' ' 77 The stat-
ute seems somewhat inartfully drawn because the word falsificado
is used to denominate both the standard meaning of the word
"forged" and the meaning of the word "alteration" (alteraci6n).
The relatively new check law of Argentina seems to pay very
170. Geneva Check Convention, art. 51; U.N. Check Convention, art. 33.
171. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 69.
172. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 33(2).
173. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 33 commentary at 5.
174. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 515 (Guatemala).
175. Id., art. 516.
176. LFY GE.NEAL, art. 194.
177. C6D1Co DE ComEcio, art. 818(11) (El Salvador).
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little attention to the question of alteration. In cases where a
checkbook and/or checks are lost or stolen, the holder must give
immediate notice to the bank. The holder must act in the same
manner when he has knowledge that the check has been altered.
"Once the bank has received this notice, it shall not pay presented
checks from those which were stolen, lost or adulterado."178 The
act makes no further mention of the word adulterado, but states
that in cases where checks are forged, the loss falls on the bank
unless the forgery of the drawer's signature is manifestly visible.
17
Colombia's approach shows that it was shaped, in part, by the
law of the United States. In Colombia, a bank is responsible to its
depositor for the payment of a check whose amount has been in-
creased, provided the depositor notifies the bank of the alteration
within three months after the altered check is returned to him. In
addition, if the alteration occurs as a result of the fault of the de-
positor, the bank is exonerated from responsibility. 8" As a further
protection to the bank, the owner of the checkbook who loses one
or more blank checks and who does not give timely notice to the
bank, may object only if the alteration is obvious.181
K. Alterations: Prior and Subsequent Parties
The UCC has a somewhat clumsy way of stating what the lia-
bilities of the parties are when there is an alteration of the instru-
ment. The maker promises that he will pay "according to its tenor
at the time of his engagement .... ,,182 The acceptor makes a sim-
ilar promise.183 What the drawer promises with respect to an alter-
ation is not clear from section 3-413(2) of the code. Another sec-
tion of the UCC states that the acceptance "is the drawee's signed
engagement to honor the draft as presented."' " The indorser also
promises to "pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time
of his indorsement . "... ,5 The guarantor also promises to pay
"according to its tenor. ,,186 The English Bills of Exchange Act
178. C6DIGo DE COMERCIO, Titulo XIII, Cap. I, art. 5 (Argentina).
179. Id., Titulo XHI, Cap. III, art. 36(3).
180. C6DIGO DE CoMCIcio, art. 732 (Colombia).
181. Id., art. 733.
182. U.C.C. § 3-413(1).
183. Id.
184. Id., § 3-410(1).
185. Id., § 3-414(1).
186. Id., § 3-416(1)(2).
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also uses this clumsy way of holding every one liable according to
the "tenour" of the instrument at the time each party signed.
18 7
What the draftsmen of the UCC were struggling to say, but
did not, is well stated in the 1930 Geneva Draft Convention:
In case of alteration of the text of a bill of exchange, parties
who have signed subsequent to the alteration are bound accord-
ing to the terms of the altered text; parties who have signed
before the alteration are bound according to the terms of the
original text. 8"
Similar language is contained in the Geneva Check Convention.'8
Venezuela" e0 and Ecuador 9' adopt the language used in the
Geneva Conventions. El Salvador is in accord, but adds the notion
that "[wihen it may not be proved if a signature has been made
before or after the alteration, it shall be presumed that it was
made before.' 92 Argentina," 3 Mexico,"' Guatemala ' 5 and Colom-
bia'" are somewhat similar language.
The UN Draft and Check Conventions adopt much of the Ge-
neva Draft and Check Conventions' language dealing with this as-
pect of alteration. However, some unfortunate language has been
added (which is indicated in italics):
(1) If an instrument has been materially altered:
(a) Parties who have signed the instrument subsequent to
the material alteration are liable thereon according to the terms
of the altered text;
(b) Parties who have signed the instrument before the ma-
terial alteration are liable thereon according to the terms of the
original text. Nevertheless a party who has himself made, au-
thorized, or assented to, the material alteration is liable on the
instrument according to the terms of the altered text.
(2) Failing proof to the contrary, a signature is deemed to have
187. Bills of Exchange Act, §§ 54, 55, 64.
188. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 69.
189. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 51.
190. C6Dio DE ComERcio, arts. 478, 491 (Venezuela).
191. C6DIGO DE CoAmaclo, arts. 478, 488 (Ecuador).
192. C6DIGo DB Commcio, art. 636 (El Salvador).
193. C6DIGO DE COMERcJo, Titulo X, Cap. I, art. 88 (Argentina).
194. LEY GPNEAiL, art. 13.
195. C6DirO DE COMERCIO, art. 395 (Guatemala).
196. C6DIGO DE Coumscio, art. 631 (Colombia).
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been placed on the instrument after [emphasis added] the mate-
rial alteration.
(3) Any alteration is material which modifies the written under-
taking on the instrument of any party in any respect. '1
It should be noted that paragraph 2 above reverses the pre-
sumption in El Salvador, Argentina, Mexico, Guatemala and Co-
lombia that the signer signed the instrument before the material
alteration. This same subsection uses the unfortunate and ambigu-
ous term "deemed." The commentary points out that:
In determining the liability of parties in a case of material
alteration, the decisive factor is whether a party signed before or
after the alteration. Since the point of time at which the instru-
ment was altered is in many cases difficult to determine, para-
graph (2) establishes a rebuttable presumption that the altera-
tion has been made before a signature was placed on the
instrument. A party may rebutt this presumption by proving
that he signed before the alteration. Such proof may be extrin-
sic to the instrument [emphasis added].'"
In another section of the UN Draft Convention, the word
"deemed" means an irrebuttable presumption.""9 Without the use
of the commentary cited above, a court might have difficulty inter-
preting this section.
The astute reader who has knowledge of the UCC might be
struck by the fact that the UN Draft and Check Conventions,
when dealing with this alteration question, do not address the con-
cept of a "fraudulent" alteration.200 The commentary notes that
the alteration of the instrument does not discharge the parties to
the instrument of their liability.210 Hence, any kind of material al-
teration, fraudulent or non-fraudulent, will trigger the operation of
the provisions.
L. Forgery of the Drawer's Signature
It is well known that banks in England and the United States
are unable to charge their customers' accounts for checks bearing
197. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 31; U.N. Check Convention art. 33.
198. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 31 commentary at 6.
199. See intra text accompanying note 297.
200. U.C.C. § 3-407.
201. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 31 commentary at 2.
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the forged signatures of their customers-drawers. Whether the rule
is grounded on Lord Mansfield's view that a drawee is bound to
know its customer's signature,202 or whether at some point there
has to be finality of payment,2 "3 the result is the same. The Anglo-
American concept of finality of payment is not the same as that
found in many civilian countries. A civilian bank can often prop-
erly charge its customers' accounts when the customers' names
have been forged. Neither the Geneva Check Convention nor the
UN Check Convention covers this problem.
In Mexico, the forgery of the signature of a drawer may not be
invoked by him/her against the bank if the forgery occurs from
his/her fault or from the fault of his/her agents, representatives
and clerks. If the check is forged on a blank furnished by the bank,
the customer may object only if the forgery is obvious or if the
customer has lost the blank checks or stubs and has given oppor-
tune notice to the bank about the 108S.204
A slightly different approach has been taken in Argentina.
The bank shall respond for the consequences of payment of
a check,in the following cases:
1. When the signature of the drawer was visibly forged.
2. When the check does not unite those essential requisites spec-
ified in art. 2 [required formalities of a check].
3. When the check does not correspond to the checkbook deliv-
ered to the drawer in conformity with what is disposed in
art. 4.205
The drawer shall respond for the damages in cases of falsification
of a check.
1. If his signature was forged on any of the checkbooks
(cuadernos) received in conformity with that disposed in article
2 [the formalities of a check] and the forgery was not manifestly
visible.
2. If the check was signed by a dependant or a person whose use
of his signature was rightful.
3. When there was no compliance with any of the obligations
imposed in article 5. [the drawer's duty to report lost or stolen
202. Price v. Neal, (1762) 3 Burr 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
203. U.C.C. § 3-418.
204. LaY GEAL, art. 194.
205. C6DIGo DE CoMERcio, Titulo XIII, Cap. III, art. 35 (Argentina).
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checks to the bank].""
The forgery is considered visibly manifest when it may be ap-
praised by a simple sight, with the rapidity and prudence imposed
by the normal banking movement in the comparison of the signa-
ture [on the check] with the one registered in the bank, in the mo-
ment of payment 07 The Argentine Commercial Code then
continues:
When the extremes indicated in the two preceding articles
do not concur, the judges shall distribute the responsibility be-
tween the bank, the drawer and the beneficiary bearer, in its
case, in accord with the circumstances and with the degree of
fault incurred by each of them.'"'
Of the Latin American Commercial Codes examined in this ar-
ticle, the Argentine treatment of the forgery-fault seems the most
sophisticated. Many of the other Latin American codes do, how-
ever, adopt the notion that the loss ought to be assessed against
the person more at fault, whether the fault is personal to the cus-
tomer or to a person who is closely related to or affiliated with him.
For example, a Colombian bank is responsible to a depositor for
the payment of a forged check, provided that the depositor notifies
the bank of the forgery within three months after the bank returns
the check to the depositor. If the forgery is due to the fault of the
drawer, the bank is exonerated from responsibility. If the forgery
was committed by the depositor's clerks, agents or representatives,
then the loss falls on the depositor.2 "'
Ecuador has taken a different approach to handling fraud. If
the bank cashes a forged check which was not delivered by the
bank to the drawer, the loss falls upon the bank. Forgery of checks
furnished by the bank to the drawer results in the loss falling on
whomever is at fault for the loss. If neither party is at fault, the
loss belongs to the bank. If the drawer does not complain within
six months from the delivery of the paid forged checks to the
drawer, the loss belongs to the drawer. Any stipulation to the con-
trary is prohibited.10
The El Salvadorian drawer-customer of a bank is obligated to
206. Id., art. 36.
207. Id.
208. Id., art. 37.
209. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 732 (Colombia).
210. LEY DE CHEQuEs, art. 60.
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give immediate notice in writing to the bank in the event of loss of
his/her checks, so that the bank will not pay those checks.21 Some-
what surprisingly, the commercial code does not seem to impose
any sanction upon the customer who forgets or fails to notify the
bank of a loss. This is indicated by a subsequent article of the code
which states:
In case of payment of a forged check, the bank shall suffer the
consequences:
I. If the signature which appears as the drawer's is ostensi-
bly different from the one given to the bank to recognize.
II. If the check exhibits signs of alterations.
III. If the check was not written (extendido) on the forms
delivered by the bank to the drawer. 2"
M. Forgery of the Payee's Signature
Under the UCC, a "'[h]older' means a person who is in pos-
session of . . . an instrument . . . drawn, issued, or indorsed to
him or his order or to bearer or in blank. '213 Under both this defi-
nition and the rule that an unauthorized signature is totally "inop-
erative as that of the person whose name is signed,' 2 14 it seems
clear that a forged indorsement of the payee's name is wholly inop-
erative, and the possessor of the forged instrument can be a holder.
Section 3-202 of the UCC states that if the instrument is payable
to order it is negotiated by delivery "with any necessary indorse-
ment." In short, no one can be a "holder" (let alone a holder in due
course) if he/she takes under the forged indorsements of the payee
or a special indorsee.215 There are certain narrowly drawn excep-
tions to this general rule (for example, the imposter rule under sec-
tion 3-405 and the negligence preclusion rule under section 3-406,)
but the general rule prevents anyone from retaining possession of
either the forged instrument or the proceeds of a check when the
indorsement is forged. The "holder" of this check or draft is liable
for breach of warranty to a payor bank or a nonbank drawee of a
211. C6DIGo DE COMERCio, art. 806 (El Salvador).
212. Id., art. 818.
213. U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
214. U.C.C. § 3-404(1).
215. Benfield, The New Payments Code and the Abolition of Holder in Due Course
Status as to Consumer Checks, 40 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 11, 23 (1983).
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draft or the maker of a promissory note.2 11 The bank violates its
contract with the drawer if it pays the wrong person, therefore, the
drawer has a right to insist that the payor recredit the customer-
drawer's account.
2 17
The basic underlying reason for the U.S. rule is that the payor
has made payment under a mistake of fact. Therefore, it is unjust
to deny restitution to the payor who has really paid out of its own
funds. In the United States, payment in these cases is not final
until the recipient of the check (or some intermediate party)
makes restitution to the payor.
The proceding relationships and results are so commonplace
in the United States that it seems to us that they must be univer-
sal. Much of the rest of the world, however, seems content with a
system which places the loss on the customer by relieving the bank
of liability and by insuring that the bona fide purchaser of the
draft or check is neither liable to the bank, nor to the original own-
er, the payee.
England has chosen what might be termed a half-way house
between the two extremes. Under the Bills of Exchange Act:
When a bill payable to order on demand is drawn on a
banker, and the banker on whom it is drawn pays the bill in
good faith and in the ordinary course of business, it is not in-
cumbent on the banker to show that the indorsement of the
payee or any subsequent indorsement was made by or under the
authority of the person whose indorsement it purports to be,
and the banker is deemed to have paid the bill in due course,
although such indorsement has been forged or made without
authority. 18
This section must then be correlated with the following section of
the Cheques Act of 1957:
Where a banker, in good faith and without negligence, (a)
receives payment for a customer of an instrument to which this
section applies; or (b) having credited a customer's account with
the amount of such instrument, receives payment thereof for
himself and the customer has no title, or a defective title, to the
instrument, the banker does not incur any liability to the true
owner of the instrument by reason only of having received pay-
216. U.C.C. §§ 4-207, 3-417.
217. U.C.C. § 4-401 comment 1.
218- Bills of Exchange Act, § 60.
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ment thereof2 "
Under these two sections, the payor bank is protected from
liability when it pays a check bearing the forged signature of the
payee, provided that it does so in good faith and in the ordinary
course of business. The drawer then has no cause of action against
the payor. The payee (the true owner) whose name has been
forged, has no cause of action against the presenting or collecting
bank (the depository bank under the Cheques Act of 1957). It
would appear that the true owner then has a cause of action
against the customer (if he can be found and is solvent) and any
prior parties, including the forger. If the forger is the customer,
then the payee will have little, if any, recourse for his/her loss.
These two enactments place most of the cost of forgery upon cus-
tomers while relieving the banks of the corresponding risks.
Whether the U.S. solution or the English system is the "better"
one, would depend upon which class (banks or customers) is being
represented by the observer. Both systems have obviously sur-
vived, if not thrived, in spite of the disparity.
The civilian approach is the direct antithesis of the approach
taken in the United States. In civilian countries, a forger can con-
vey good title to a bona fide transferee, a payor (bank or non-bank
drawee) is not obligated to verify the authenticity of the indorse-
ments and payment under a forged indorsement may be rightful.
Part of the basic civilian approach is stated in the Geneva
Draft Convention:
The possessor of a bill of exchange is deemed to be the law-
ful holder if he establishes his title to the bill through an unin-
terrupted series of endorsements, even if the last endorsement is
in blank. In this connection, cancelled endorsements are deemed
not to be written (non ecrits). When an endorsement in blank is
followed by another endorsement, the person who signed this
last endorsement is deemed to have acquired the bill by the en-
dorsement in blank.
Where a person has been dispossessed of a bill of exchange,
in any manner whatsoever, the holder who establishes his right
thereto in the manner mentioned in the preceding paragraph is
not bound to give up the bill unless he has acquired it in bad
faith, or unless in acquiring it he has been guilty of gross




Similar concepts are found in the Geneva Check Convention, al-
though the wording differs slightly. 2'
Insofar as payment is concerned, the Geneva Draft Conven-
tion provides: "[h]e who pays at maturity is validly discharged, un-
less he has been guilty of fraud or gross negligence. He is bound to
verify the regularity of the series of indorsements, but not the sig-
nature of the indorsers."'22 The Geneva Check Convention states
the rule in even more terse language: "[t]he drawee who pays an
endorseable cheque is bound to verify the regularity of the series of
indorsements, but not the signature of the indorsers. '" z2
The Geneva Draft Conventions' language regarding the "unin-
terrupted series of endorsements" is repeated in the Argentine
Commercial Code."2' The Conventions' imposition of a limited
duty of inquiry upon the payor is also replicated in that code. 20
The phrase "uninterrupted series of endorsements" simply means
that the payee's signature (genuine or forged) is the first signature
on the reverse side of the check. Articles 19, 21 and 35 of the Ge-
neva Check Convention are adopted in the Argentine Check Law.
The Argentine draftsmen, however, add an interesting concept: al-
though the payor is not bound to verify the authenticity of the
signatures of the prior indorsers (as stated in the Geneva Conven-
tion) he is obligated "to verify the authenticity of the last in-
dorser's signature."'22 The Geneva Draft Conventions' language
has also been adopted in Venezuela without a real change in the
text."2 7
El Salvador, while following much of the civilian view, adds
some interesting concepts:
The owner of an instrument to order is the holder in whose
favor it was issued, while there has not been any indorsement.
The holder of an instrument to order which has been indorsed
shall be considered the owner, provided that he justifies his
220. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 16.
221. Geneva Cheque Convention, arts. 19, 21.
222. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 40.
223. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 35.
224. C6DIGo DE COMERCIO, Titulo X, Cap. II, art. 17 (Argentina).
225. Id., art. 43.
226. Id., Titulo XIII, Cap. III. art. 32 (Argentina).
227. C6DIGO DE COMERClO, arts. 424, 448 (Venezuela).
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right by means of an uninterrupted series of indorsements.228
The duty of the payor is artfully delineated:
He that pays is not obligated to ascertain the authenticity of the
indorsements, nor does he have the power to require that it be
proved, but he must verify the identity of the person who
presents the instrument as the last holder, and the continuity of
the indorsements.
2 9
In a sense, both Argentina and El Salvador follow the "know your
indorser" rule of the New York Stock Exchange.30
The Mexican law28 1 is a virtual copy of the language used in El
Salvador. Mexico, however, adds the thought that institutions of
credit are authorized to credit the account of their customers for
instruments even when the customer fails to indorse the instru-
ment to the institution. Mexican law requires that a statement be
written on the instrument that the amount has been credited to
the customer's account.13 This provision resembles section 4-205
of the UCC which authorizes the depository bank to indorse an
instrument on behalf of the customer.
The Mexican law also provides for a quasi in rem procedure
whereby the owner of an instrument may have the instrument can-
celled if the instrument is lost or taken from him by robbery. One
who purchases the instrument before the entry of a judgment of
cancellation can neither be affected by this procedure nor be
forced to surrender the instrument unless, it is proved that he pur-
chased the instrument in grave fault or in bad faith. 31 If, the pur-
chaser purchases the instrument after the publication of the decree
of cancellation in the Diario Official, he is considered to be guilty
of grave fault.1
34
Article 424 of the Ecuadorian Commercial Code follows article
16 of the Geneva Draft Convention fairly closely, while article 448
of the code follows article 40 of the convention. The draftsmen,
however, added a gloss: "[hje who pays at maturity, shall remain
legitimately exonerated, unless there has been fraud or grave fault
228. C6DIoo DE COMERCIO, art. 671 (El Salvador).
229. Id., art. 672.
230. Insurance Co. v. North America v. United States, 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1057 (E.D.
Pa. 1983).
231. LEY GENERAL, arts. 38-39.
232. Id., art. 39.
233. Id., art. 43.
234. Id., arts. 43, 45.
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on his part."835 The Ecuadorian Check provisions governing forger-
ies of the payee's signature closely resemble the Geneva Check
Convention, although Ecuador (like El Salvador) imposes a duty
upon the bank to verify "the identity of the person to whom pay-
ment is made." 8 "
Colombia's treatment of this problem seems only a partial so-
lution. Under the Colombian code, "the possessor of an instrument
shall be considered the legitimate holder if he possesses it in con-
formity with its law of circulation."' 87 The Colombian code also
states that "[iun order for the holder of an instrument to order to
legitimate it, the chain of indorsers must be uninterrupted. 88
The UN Draft Check Conventions attempt to reach a compro-
mise between the extremely different views of the United States
and the civilian countries. Under these two draft conventions, a
person is a holder if he is in "possession of an instrument which
has been endorsed to him, or on which the last endorsement is in
blank, and on which there appears an uninterrupted series of en-
dorsements, even if any of the endorsements was forged or was
signed by an agent without authority. [Emphasis added].""8
The UN Draft Convention then goes on to state that:
(1) If an endorsement is forged, any party has against the
forger, and against the person to whom the instrument was di-
rectly transferred by the forger, [emphasis added] the right to
recover compensation for any damages that he may have suf-
fered because of the forgery.
(2) The liability of a party or of the drawee who pays, or of
any endorsee for collection who collects, an instrument on which
there is a forged endorsement is not regulated by this
Convention.240
The UN Check Convention has very similar language.24 1
The commentaries to both the Draft and Check Conventions
point out that the effect of the above language is to make payment
235. C6DIGO DE COMERCi, art. 448 (Ecuador).
236. LEY DE CHEQUES, arts. 18, 30.
237. C6DIGO DE COaixRClO, art. 647 (Colombia).
238. Id., art. 661.
239. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 14; U.N. Check Convention, art. 16. The U.N. Check
Convention uses the same wording, except the word "cheque" is substituted for the word
"instrument."
240. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 23(1) & (2).
241. U.N. Check Convention, art. 25(1) & (2).
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final as between the drawer and the drawee and between the
drawee and the holder of the draft or check. The only non-final
aspect is the fact that the payee can sue the forger or the first
taker from the forger. This latter result is bottomed on the notion
that the taker from the forger ought to know with whom he has
dealt, and is, therefore, in the best position to prevent the fraudu-
lent transmission of the instrument. The commentaries also note
that if the first taker from the forger negotiates the instrument to
another holder, the latter holder takes in bad faith and is not liable
to the payee.2 42 The comments also note that the use of the phrase
"any party" enables a drawer who suffers a theft of the instrument
(from the mails, for example) to sue the forger or the first taker
from the forger, if the drawer suffers any loss from the theft and
forgery.
243
A casual reading of article 25 and its comments will give the
reader a feeling of mental contentment. A second or third reading,
however, will result in mental indigestion because of inconsisten-
cies between the text and the commentary. For example, subsec-
tion 2 of article 25 states: "the liability of a party or of the drawee
who pays, or of an endorsee for collection who collects, a cheque on
which there is a forged endorsement is not regulated by this Con-
vention." This subsection seems to state that the convention does
not regulate the rights and duties of a party who pays or of a
drawee who pays. However, commentary 20 to this section states:
Finality of Payment. Under Article 25 that advantage is sub-
stantially achieved; payment by the drawee is final. The legal
relations between the drawee and the drawer, the payee and the
drawer, the endorsers between themselves, the drawee and the
person receiving payment are settled in a final way. The only
"nonfinal" element is the rule that enables the person from
whom the cheque was stolen to recover damages from the person
who acquired the cheque from the forger.
In a kind of "over-kill" fashion, the commentary continues:
Economy of remedies. Payment by a drawee effects a discharge
of his obligation to the drawer; the drawee may debit the
drawer's account. There is no occasion for further action be-
tween them. It follows that there is no need for further action
between the drawee and the person receiving payment, or be-
242. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 23 commentary at 27; U.N. Check Convention, art. 25
commentary at 27.
243. Id., commentary at 26.
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tween him and previous endorsers. The person whose signature
is forged (payee or endorsee) loses his right to act upon the
cheque, and therefore there is no need for further action by him
against the drawer, drawee or any subsequent endorsee. All
these potential actions are replaced by a single right of action to
the owner of the cheque against the forger and the person who
acquired the cheque from the forger.
24
If these comments are correct, then subsection 2 of article 25
is superfluous because there is really nothing left to regulate by the
law of the various countries insofar as the drawee or other payor is
concerned. This suggestion is, however, contradicted by a further
commentary to article 25: "[P]aragraph (2) makes clear that the
convention makes no rule in respect of the liability of a party or
the drawee to whom the cheque is transferred consequent upon
payment of it by him." 45 This commentary seems to directly con-
tradict the previous commentary. It also seems to be wrong inter-
nally because a holder, in presenting for payment does not transfer
the draft or check to the drawee. Therefore, the drawee does not
become a transferee in a legal sense. The drawee upon present-
ment is merely being called upon to pay, and is not acquiring title
to the draft or check.
The next comment adds: "[Pjaragraph (2) further lays down
that the convention does not deal with the liability of a bank to
which the forger has endorsed a cheque for collection and to which
it is subsequently paid."246 This commentary is apparently at-
tempting to clarify the poor and conflicting drafting of subsections
1 and 2. Subsection 1 says that the first taker from the forger is
liable to any party, while subsection 2 says that the convention
does not regulate the liabilities of a collecting bank which in many,
if not most, cases is the first taker from the forger. If the collecting
bank's rights are not to be governed by the convention, then what
is the reason for this omission? In the United States, the collecting
bank can sue any of the prior indorsers (forger, and first taker,
second taker, etc. from the forger) for breach of warranty, which
then upsets the "finality" rule mentioned in the commentaries."4 7
In short, the so-called uniformity of the convention could be de-
stroyed in this area because of the failure to regulate the rights
244. Id., commentary at 21.
245. Id., commentary at 28.
246. Id., commentary at 29.
247. Supra note 216.
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and duties of the collecting bank.
N. Crossed Checks and Checks Payable in Account
1. CROSSED CHECKS
As discussed in the preceeding section, a forger of the payee's
name has the power in the civilian systems to pass on good title to
a check, and the good faith drawee who pays a forged check is not
liable to the drawer.2 4 8 Even in England, legislation has been en-
acted to protect the payor and collecting banks.2 4 9 In light of this
policy, it seems almost inevitable that a countervailing rule would
develop to protect against forgery. One of the most commonly
adopted concepts has been the crossed check. The crossed check is
simply an ordinary check with two parallel transverse lines with or
without the word "banker" or the specific name of a bank inserted
between the two transverse lines. If these two parallel transverse
lines are present (with or without the word "banker" inserted be-
tween them), then the drawee-payor bank can pay only another
bank (under some legislation) for "transit items"200 or its own cus-
tomer for an "on us"251 item. If the specific name of a bank is in-
serted between the transverse lines, then the drawee-payor bank
must pay only that specific bank. In the event that a drawee-payor
fails to act in accordance with these rules, it is liable up to the face
amount of the check.
28 2
The real protections accorded by the crossed check concept
are that if the check is drawn on the bank by one customer and
presented for payment by another customer of the same bank, the
drawee is in a position to determine the identity of the presenter
and the authenticity of the indorsement. If the crossed check is a
"transit item," and if the drawee-payor bank pays the collecting
bank (as it is bound to do) then the presenting-collecting bank is
in a good position to determine the identity of its customer and
the authenticity of his indorsement.
248. See supra text accompanying note 46.
249. The Stamp Act, 1853, 16:17 Vict., ch. 59; the Cheques Act, 1957, supra note 219.
250. "Transit items" are items being handled by depository and collecting banks for
payment by a drawee bank.
251. "On us" items refer to those situations where the drawee and depository bank are
the same.
252. See Bills of Exchange Act §§ 76-81; Geneva Check Convention, arts. 37-38; see
also, Murray, Cross Checks, Account Payee, and Non-negotiable Checks: Some Suggestions
from Foreign Law, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 273 (1968).
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If the drawee and presenting banks comply with the law, the
only way that a forger can "beat" the system is to open an account
in the name of the true payee and have sufficient identification to
impersonate the true payee in the collection of the forged check. In
this assumed case it appears that the English presenting bank
would be absolved from liability if it were in good faith and acted
in the ordinary course of business."" The same result follows in the
civilian countries, as discussed in the preceding section . 54
The Geneva Check Conventions' cross checked provisions are
closely tracked in the UN Check Convention. It is to be noted,
however, that article 70 of the UN Convention covers not only the
drawee but also "the banker who takes or collects" a crossed check
and makes it liable for any violation of the rules.
Guatemala2 55 provides for the crossed check in language which
does not track the Geneva Convention but which has similar re-
sults. The Argentina crossed check rules closely follow the Geneva
Check Convention rules2 5" Even though the crossed check rules in
El Salvador do not closely follow the check convention, the con-
cepts are similar.2 57 The Colombian crossed check rules are virtu-
ally the same as the Guatemalan,'25 8 and much of the wording of
the Mexican, provisions are the same as in Colombia.259 Some of
the wording of the crossed check provisions in Ecuador track the
Geneva language, but certain phrases and clauses seem to have
been omitted.2 6 0 Venezuela does not appear to recognize the
crossed check.
2. CHECKS PAYABLE IN ACCOUNT
The Geneva Check Convention provides yet another method
of reducing the risk of forgery by the use of a check which can only
be paid into the account of the payee:
The drawer or the holder of a cheque may forbid its payment in
cash by writing transversally across the face of the cheque the
words "payable in account" ("a porter en compte") or a similar
253. Cheques Act, 1957, § 4 (formerly § 82 of the Bills of Exchange Act).
254. See supra text accompanying note 218.
255. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, arts. 517-20 (Guatemala).
256. C6DIGO DE ComzRcio, Titulo XIII, Cap. V, arts. 44-45 (Argentina).
257. C6oDIGO DE CoMERclo, art. 823 (El Salvador).
258. CODIo DE COMERCio, arts. 734-36 (Colombia).
259. LEY GENERAL, art. 197.
260. LEY DE CHEQUES, arts. 32-33 (Ecuador).
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expression.
In such a case the cheque can only be settled by the drawee by
means of a book-entry (credit in account, transfer from one ac-
count to another, set off or clearing-house settlement). Settle-
ment by book-entry is equivalent to payment.
Any obliteration of the words "payable in account" shall be
deemed not to have taken place.
The drawee who does not observe the foregoing provisions is lia-
ble for resulting damage up to the amount of the cheque.
26 '
Neither the UCC nor the English Bills of Exchange Act recog-
nize this procedure. The practice has developed in England, how-
ever, to use the phrase "account payee" or similar words, in con-
junction with the crossed check. It has been held that bankers are
put on notice by this legend and a disregard of it may well consti-
tute negligence." 2
Under the wording of the Geneva Check Convention, if the
check is drawn with the words "payable in account" written on the
face, a drawee bank can either credit the account of the payee if
he/she is a depositor with the drawee, or make a clearinghouse set-
tlement with a presenting-depository bank. The Geneva Conven-
tion is strangely silent about any duty of the depository bank to
also make certain that the funds are paid to the account of the
payee.
The El Salvadorian articulation of "payable in account" seems
to be better than the Geneva wording:
The drawer or the holder may order that a check be not paid in
cash, by means of the insertion in the document of the expres-
sion "for payment in account." In this case, the drawee shall
only make payment by crediting the amount of the check in the
account which it has or opens in favor of the holder, or to the
bank in which it has been deposited to his account. The drawee
who pays in another form, is responsible for irregular payment.
When the expression is found on the face [of the check], the
credit must be made for the first holder; when it is found across
an indorsement, the credit shall be made in favor of said
indorser.
The check is not negotiable starting from the insertion of the
clause "for payment in account." The clause may not be erased.
261. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 39.
262. BmEs. supra note 77, at 280.
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The check for payment in account does not require the signa-
ture of the customer. 2 "
Argentina tracks the Geneva rules rather closely.2" A somewhat
similar approach is taken in Mexico.26 It is implied in both codifi-
cations that the account must be in the drawee bank and not in a
presenting bank. This implication is made a little more clearly in
the Guatemalan Code which provides that "[i]f the holder does not
have an account and the bank refuses to open one, its refusal of
payment will be, without responsibility."2 66 This confinement of
"payable in account" to an account in the drawee bank is even
clearer in Colombia: "[iln this case, the drawee shall only pay the
check by crediting its amount in the account which the holder has
or opens."' 267 Ecuador also tracks the Geneva language rather
closely.2
68
0. Underlying Validity of a Draft or Check In Spite of Forged
Signatures
It is the experience of the author that law students (and some-
times lawyers) have difficulty comprehending that even though a
negotiable instrument may have forged signatures, signatures of
imaginary persons or signatures of incompetents, it still might
have some legal and economic viability because of some genuine
signatures on the instrument. This problem becomes acute when
attempting to distinguish between the differing legal results which
occur when a forgery of the drawer's signature is compared with a
forgery of a payee or special indorsee's signature.
The UCC does not have a succinct, comprehensive statement
covering this situation. The Geneva Draft Convention does, how-
ever, answer the problem directly:
If a bill of exchange bears signatures of persons incapable of
binding themselves by a bill of exchange, or forged signatures, or
signatures of fictitious persons, or signatures which for any other
reason cannot bind the persons who signed the bill of exchange
or on whose behalf it was signed, the obligations of the other
263. C6DIGo DE COMxRCIO, art. 824 (El Salvador).
264. C6DIGo DE CoMzRcio, Titulo XIII, Cap. VI, art. 46 (Argentina).
265. LEY GENERAL, art. 198.
266. C6DIGo Dt ComzRcio, art. 522 (Guatemala).
267. C6DIGO D COMERClo, art. 737 (Colombia).
268. LEY DE CHRQUES, arts. 34-35.
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persons who signed it are none the less valid." '
Very similiar language is found in the Geneva Check
Convention.1
70
The provisions of the Geneva Draft and Check Conventions
are adopted in Argentina.27" ' Somewhat similar language has been
adopted in Mexico, 72 Guatemala2sa and El Salvador. 74 Ecuador
has chosen a bifurcated approach: one article states that "the falsi-
fication of a signature, even when it is of the drawer or of the ac-
ceptor, does not affect the validity of the other signatures. '27 5 A
prior article states that "[i]f a bill of exchange bears the signature
of persons incapable of obligating themselves, this does not affect
the validity of the obligations contracted by the other signato-
ries."27 The two foregoing articles are applicable to bills of ex-
change. Article 10 of the Geneva Check Convention is a part of the
Ecuadorian law of checks.2
77
P. The "Shelter Principle"
It is a familiar rule in the United States that "a holder from a
holder in due course has all the rights of a holder in due course,"
or as expressed by the UCC:
Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as
the transferor has therein, except that a transferee who has him-
self been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instru-
ment or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim
against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later
holder in due course.
218
The phrase "or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or
claim against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later
holder in due course" is illustrated by comment 2(c):
269. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 7.
270. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 10.
271. C6DIGO DE CoMEscio, Titulo X, Cap. I, art. 7; Titulo XIII, Cap. I, art. 10
(Argentina).
272. LEY GENERAL, art. 12.
273. C6DIGo DR Coumncio, art. 394 (Guatemala).
274. C6DIGo DR COMERCIO, art. 635 (El Salvador).
275. C6DIoO DE CoMnCio, art. 477 (Ecuador).
276. Id., art. 416.
277. LEY DR CHEQUES, art. 9.
278. U.C.C. § 3-201(1).
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A induces M by fraud to make an instrument payable to A,
A negotiates it to B, who takes with notice of the fraud. B nego-
tiates it to C, a holder in due course, and then repurchases the
instrument from C. B does not succeed to C's rights as a holder
in due course, and remains subject to the defense of fraud.
This provision of the UCC is both a statement of the general prop-
erty concept that an owner can transfer all of his rights to another
free of prior claims, and, at the same time, a public policy limita-
tion on the property rule.
The English Bills of Exchange Act has a much narrower provi-
sion regarding the shelter principle:
A holder (whether for value or not) who derives his title to a
bill through a holder in due course, and who is not himself a
party to any fraud or illegality affecting it, has all the rights of
that holder in due course as regards the acceptor and all parties
to the bill prior to that holder."'
It should be noted that this provision makes no mention of the
prior party concept articulated in the UCC. The UN Check and
Draft Conventions, however, allegedly do cover the "prior party"
principle: "The transfer of a cheque by a protected holder vests in
any subsequent holder the rights to and upon the cheque which
the protected holder had, except where such subsequent holder
participated in a transaction which gives rise to a claim to or a
defense upon the cheque.
'" 28 0
Although these articles make no mention of prior parties, a
commentary does address this issue:
The shelter rule applies irrespective of whether the subse-
quent holder to whom the cheque is transferred is a previous
party to the change. Example D. The payee P induces by fraud
the drawer to draw a cheque to P, which P transfers to A who
knows about the fraud. A transfers to B who is a protected
holder. B transfers to C and C to A. A acquires the rights of a
protected holder according to article 29(1) although as a previ-
ous party he was a holder against whom the drawer could have
raised the defense of fraud." 1
This UN provision, which allows a prior party to wash the in-
279. Bills of Exchange Act, § 29(3).
280. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 27; U.N. Check Convention, art. 29.
281. U.N. Check Convention, art. 29 commentary at 2.
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strument clean by a negotiation to a "protected party," is the di-
rect antithesis of the UCC provision. Unfortunately, the comment
makes no mention of any reason for this approach. Is commerce
really facilitated when knowing purchasers of negotiable instru-
ments can work in cooperation with defrauders to cleanse the pa-
per? It is one thing for a knowing purchaser to purchase from a
protected holder and acquire his protected status. It is something
else to allow the knowing purchaser to create a protected holder
who can then convey good title back to the knowing transferor. It
is suggested that this is carrying a good principle to extremes. This
official commentary goes beyond the literal terms ot the article. A
close reading of the article does not necessarily lead one to the con-
clusion of the commentary.
Q. Rights of the Transferee Without Indorsement
Under the UCC, 82 if a payee (or special indorsee) transfers
the instrument without indorsing it, the transferee is a holder be-
cause of the absence of the indorsement. He/she is, however, a
transferee with all the rights of the payee (or special indorsee.) If
the payee (or special indorsee) is a holder in due course, then the
transferee has the same rights. In addition, the transferee has the
right to have a court compel the transferor to indorse (unless there
was some contrary agreement). This aspect of the "shelter princi-
ple" is paralleled in the English Bills of Exchange Act: "[wJhere
the holder of a bill payable to his order transfers it for value with-
out indorsing it, the transfer gives the transferee such title as the
transferor had in the bill, and, in addition, the transferee acquires
the right the have the indorsement of the transferor." '28
The Mexican and El Salvadorian Commercial Codes have pro-
visions which closely parallel the Anglo-American laws. The Mexi-
can Commercial Code states:
The transfer of an instrument made payable to a person
(nominativo) by an ordinary assignment or by any other legal
means different from the indorsement, subrogates the acquirer
to all of the rights which the instrument confers; but it is subject
to all of the personal objections that the obligor may oppose
against the author of the transfer. The transferee has the right
282. U.C.C. § 3-201.
283. Bills of Exchange Act, § 31(4).
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to demand the delivery of the instrument. 28'
The Mexican Code then adds:
He who proves that a negotiable instrument made payable to a
person has been transferred by means distinct from an indorse-
ment, may demand that the judge, by Way of a voluntary action,
make a record of the transfer on the same document or an af-
fixed sheet. The signature of the judge must be certified.285
The language of the El Salvadorian Commercial Code closely
tracks the language of the Mexican Commercial Code. However,
the El Salvadorian Code adds a clause providing that "[tlhe record
which the judge places on the instrument, shall be taken as an
indorsement."8s
R. Accommodated Parties: Who is the Party Being
Accommodated?
Under the UCC287 and the prior NIL,28 8 a person may sign in
the status of a maker, indorser or acceptor as an accommodation
party for another party on the instrument. It is often impossible in
this case to determine who is the party being accommodated -
(the principal debtor) from merely looking at the face or reverse
side of the instrument. As a result, parol testimony can be used by
the accommodation party to show for whom he/she signed, as
against immediate parties and remote parties who have notice of
the accommodation nature of the transaction.'8 ' Under this view, if
two people sign as makers, they can testify that they signed for the
benefit of the payee and thereby defeat liability when they are
sued by the payee. In addition, an indorser can testify that he
signed for the benefit of the maker or of another indorser-
indorsee."90
This practice of admitting parol testimony has developed
partly because the UCC has neither a provision requiring an ac-
commodation party to indicate for whom he/she is acting as an ac-
284. LEY GENa., art. 27.
285. Id., art. 28.
286. C6DIGo DE COMERCIO, arts. 660, 661 (El Salvador).
287. U.C.C. § 3-415.
288. N.I.L., supra note 88, § 29.
289. U.C.C. § 3-415.
290. Murray, Accommodation Party PitfalUs: A Statutory Change is Needed, 15 U.C.C.
L.J. 248 (1983).
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commodation party, nor any provision stating the result if the ac-
commodation party fails to indicate the name of the principal
debtor. This failure to legislate is harmless if all men are angels,
but if a maker can defeat liability by perjuring himself/herself by
testifying that he/she signed for the payee, the maker might just
succumb to temptation. By the same token, if a payee is sued by a
subsequent party, the payee might be tempted to perjure himself!
herself in order to escape liability.
Section 28(1) of the English Bills of Exchange Act states that
an "accommodation party to a bill is a person who has signed a bill
as drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefore,
for the purpose of lending his name to some other person." This
language seems broad enough to lead to the same result as in the
United States.
The civilian system recognizes only one form of a "surety" on
a negotiable instrument: the aval, which can be translated as a
guaranty. The aval, is given under the Geneva Draft Convention
by writing the words "good as aval" or other equivalent formula
followed by the signature of the giver of the aval on the reverse
side of the draft. The giver of the aval (the avalista in Spanish)
can give the guaranty by merely signing his name on the face of
the draft without adding the foregoing language.""
Under the Geneva Draft Convention,' 9 2 "[a] n 'aval' must spec-
ify for whose account it is given. In default of this, it is deemed to
be given for the drawer."'3 The Geneva Check Convention has an
identical provision regarding checks .
4
The UN Draft Convention repeats much of the wording of the
Geneva Draft and Check Conventions, but turns part of the rule
upside down by providing that a "guarantor may specify the per-
son for whom he has become guarantor, in the absence of such
specification, the person for whom he has become guarantor is the
acceptor or the drawee in the case of a bill, and the maker in the
case of a note [emphasis added]."'' The commentary states that
the aval is deemed to be in favor of the acceptor, a drawee or the
maker of the note, because this "rule is justified by the fact that it
is from the drawee, acceptor or maker that payment must initially
291. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 31.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 26.
295. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 42(5).
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be demanded."2" A further commentary states that the word
"deemed" must be construed as creating an "irrebuttable pre-
sumption" that the aval is given for the acceptor, drawee or maker
of a note, in the absence of a clear indication otherwise. '97
The Geneva Draft Conventions' provisions dealing with prom-
issory notes state that if the aval fails to indicate for whom it is
given, it is deemed to have been given for the maker of the note.2 "8
Argentina,29' Venezuela300 and Ecuador 10' follow the Geneva Draft
Convention. El Salvador, although following many of the same
aval concepts which are found in the Geneva Draft Convention,
deviates from the Draft Convention by stating that if the aval fails
to indicate for whose benefit it is extended, then it shall be for the
acceptor and if there is none, then, in favor of the drawer.3 02 The
same rule holds true in Mexico.303
Guatemala's treatment of this problem is most unusual. When
the giver of the aval fails to indicate for whom he signs, "it shall be
understood that it guaranties the obligations of the signatory who
discharges (liber) the greatest number of obligors."'3' Colombia, on
the other hand, follows the view that when the giver of the aval
fails to indicate the party guaranteed, the aval guaranties the obli-
gations of all of the parties to the instrument3 05
S. Accommodation Parties and the Invalidity of the Principal
Obligation
Courts in the United States are split as to whether an accom-
modation party's liability is discharged when the principal obliga-
tion is deemed invalid because of forgery, fraud, duress, etc.'"
Nothing in sections 3-415 and 3-416 of the UCC (and their respec-
tive comments) is specifically directed to this question. It appears,
under section 3-416, that when an accommodation party guaranties
payment, the guarantor is liable (under the majority view) even
296. Id., commentary at 4.
297. Id., commentary at 5.
298. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 77.
299. C6DIGo DE CoumEcio, Titulo X, Cap. IV, arts. 32-34 (Argentina).
300. CODIGO DE CoMERcio, art. 439 (Venezuela).
301. C6DIGO DE COMERCio, art. 439 (Ecuador).
302. C6DIGO DE COMERCio, art. 728 (El Salvador).
303. L Y GENERAL, art. 113.
304. C6DIGo DE COMEEcio, art. 404 (Guatemala).
305. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 637 (Colombia).
306. L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP, 271-73 (1850).
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when it is proved that the signature of the principal debtor was
forged.307 The result is premised on the view that the payment
guarantor is liable without any presentment, etc., to the principal
debtor. In fact, the payment guarantor's liability "becomes indis-
tinguishable from that of a co-maker. 3 0 8 It also appears that the
simple accommodation party under section 3-415 cannot plead
usury if, for example, the corporate principal debtor cannot plead
it as a defense. 09 Part of the problem is that the UCC (and prior
case law) recognizes two classes of sureties, the simple accommoda-
tion party and the guarantor. Even though the Restatement of Se-
curity3 10 has tried to treat these two classes as one, the code and
the cases appear to perpetuate the dicotomy. The instant problem,
as well as other problems can be solved by consolidating sureties
into one class with uniform rights and duties.
As stated in the preceding section of this article, the civilian
system recognizes only one form of a "surety" on a negotiable in-
strument: the aval.311 The Geneva Draft Convention provides that
the avalista's (the guarantor's) "undertaking is valid even when
the liability which he has guaranteed is inoperative for any reason
other than defect of form."3132 The Geneva Check Convention also
provides that the payment of checks can be guaranteed by use of
the aval. The language in the Check Convention closely follows the
provisions in the Draft Convention.31 8
Venezuela follows the same aval concepts, but adds the
thought that the avalista is subrogated to the claim. 814 Mexico law
provides that the guarantor is severally liable with the person
whose signature has been guaranteed, and "his obligation is valid,
even when the guaranteed obligation is void for any cause." ' A
similar rule prevails in Ecuador.1 6 The Colombian version of this
rule is worded differently but is conceptually the same.31 7 The Ar-
307. Universal Metals & Machinery, Inc. v. Bohart, 19 Tex. 360, 539 S.W. 2d 874, 19
U.C.C. RE-P. SERV. 891 (1976).
308. U.C.C. § 3-416 official comment.
309. See, e.g., Artistic Greetings, Inc. v. Sholom Greeting Card Co., Inc., 318 N.Y.S.2d
623, 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1294 (1971).
310. RESTATEMENT OF SEcURrry § 82 comment 6 (1937-40).
311. See supra text accompanying note 286.
312. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 32.
313. Id., arts. 25-27.
314. C6DIGO DE Commco, art. 440 (Venezuela).
315. LEY GENERAL, art. 114.
316. C6DIGO DE CownRcio, art. 440 (Ecuador).
317. C6DIGO DE COMERCio, art. 636 (Colombia).
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gentine version closely tracks the Geneva Convention language."'
Guatemala affirms that the avalista remains liable "even when the
obligation of the party accommodated [avalado] is null for any
cause.""' El Salvador, using different wording, follows the same
notion.
3 2 0
The UN Draft Convention and Check Conventions, for some
unexplained reason, have deviated from the general rule used in
civilian countries that the guarantor remains liable even though
the principal obligation is void. Under virtually the same wording,
both conventions advance the view that "[a] guarantor is liable on
the instrument$2 ' [cheque]2 2 to the same extent as the party for
whom he has become guarantor, unless the guarantor has stipu-
lated otherwise on the instrument." One of the commentaries notes
that "the guarantor may base defenses against his liability on the
instrument on the defences which the party for whom he became
guarantor may invoke. 3 23 This complete deviation from the gen-
eral civilian approach must have been dictated by the draftsmen's
desire to compromise by shifting this concept towards the ap-
proach followed by the United States.
T. Guaranty of Payment of a Check
The concept of a guaranty of the payment of a check would
seem to be entirely foreign to Anglo-American law (although the
author sadly remembers having a few checks which he now wishes
had been guaranteed). Under the UCC if a person signs his name
on the reverse side of a check he can be considered an accommoda-
tion indorser.32 ' The same result follows under the English Bills of
Exchange Act.3
25
Under the Geneva Check Convention: "Payment of a cheque
may be guaranteed by an 'aval' as to the whole or part of its
amount. This guarantee may be given by a third person other than
the drawee, or even by a person who has signed the cheque. "32
6
318. CODIGo DE COMERCIO, Titulo X, Cap. IV, art. 34 (Argentina).
319. C6DIGO DE CoMmacio, art. 403 (Guatemala).
320. C6DIGO DE CoMERcio, art. 729 (El Salvador).
321. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 43.
322. U.N. Check Convention, art. 41.
323. Id., commentary at 2.
324. U.C.C. §§ 3-402, 3-415, 3-416.
325. Bills of Exchange Act, § 56.
326. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 25.
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The convention then goes into the mechanics of the aval:
An 'aval' is given either on the cheque itself or on an 'al-
longe.' It is expressed by the words 'good as aval', or by any
other equivalent formula. It is signed by the giver of the 'aval.'
It is deemed to be constituted by the mere signature of the giver
of the 'aval' placed on the face of the cheque, except in the case
of the signature of the drawer. An 'aval' must specify for whose
account it is given. In default of this, it is deemed to be given for
the drawer.
27
The UN Check Convention closely tracks the language of the
Geneva Convention, except that it adds the following language "a
signature alone on the back of the cheque is an endorsement.
3 2 8
The giver of an aval under this clause must add the word aval or
words of similar import in order to be distinguished from a mere
indorser.
Colombia,/2 9 El Salvador,8 0 Venezuela,"' Mexico 32 and Gua-
temala88 all recognize the ability to guaranty checks in a manner
similar to the guaranty of drafts and with the same legal effects.
U. Time of Presentment for Payment of Checks
The UCC has taken a limited approach to the question of
what is a reasonable time to present a check for payment:
In the case of an uncertified check which is drawn and pay-
able within the United States and which is not a draft drawn by
a bank the following are presumed to be reasonable periods
within which to present for payment or to initiate bank
collection.
(a) with respect to the liability of the drawer, thirty days after
date or issue which is later, and
(b) with respect to the liability of an indorser, seven days after
his indorsement33'
327. Id., art. 26.
328. U.N. Check Convention, art. 40(4)(b).
329. C6DIGO DR CoMERclo, arts. 632-38 (Colombia).
330. CODIGO DR COMRCIO, arts. 803, 725-31 (El Salvador).
331. C6DIGO DE CoMEacio, arts. 496, 438-40 (Venezuela).
332. LEY GENERAL, arts. 196, 109-16.
333. C6DGO DE COMERCIO, arts. 400-05 (Guatemala).
334. U.C.C. § 3-503(2).
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What happens in the United States if a check is mailed from
San Francisco to New York and it takes a week or so to wind its
way to the payee or from the payee to an indorsee; is the delay in
the mails to be taken into account? What happens if a check is
drawn in Mexico City, Mexico, payable in New York: when must
presentment be made? What is the result of a check drawn in New
York and payable in Mexico City? Of course, one may dismiss the
whole problem by saying that these are choice of law problems, not
negotiable instrument problems. This academic "answer" is of lit-
tle assistance to bankers, lawyers, businessmen, etc. On the other
hand, if the UCC controls the question, presentment has to be
made within a "reasonable time," whatever this term means.
The English law is scarcely more helpful. It states that "[imn
determining what is a reasonable time, regard shall be had to the
nature of the bill, the usage of trade with regard to similar bills,
and the facts of the particular case. '' 35
Some other countries deal with this problem in a more satisfy-
ing manner. In Mexico, for example:
Checks shall be presented for payment:
I. Within fifteen calendar days which follow their date [of
insurance]; if they are payable in the same place of their
dispatch;
II. Within one month, if they are dispatched and payable in
diverse places in the national territory;
III. Within three months, if they are dispatched in foreign
countries and payable in the national territory; and
IV. Within three months, if they are dispatched within the na-
tional territory to be paid in foreign countries, provided
that another time has not been fixed by the laws of the
place of presentation."' 6
Guatemala is content to state that checks must be presented
"within fifteen days of their creation. 3 3 7 El Salvador's provisions
are a replica of the Mexican provisions.3" In Argentina, checks
drawn within the country must be presented within thirty days
and checks drawn out of the country, but payable in Argentina,
335. Bills of Exchange Act, § 45-[2].
336. LEY GnzNKAL, art. 181.
337. C6rn.o DE COMERCIO, art. 502 (Guatemala).
338. C6rIco Di COMRCmio, art. 808 (El Salvador).
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must be presented within sixty days of issuance.8 ' Ecuador has a
different approach to the time of presentment problem:
Checks issued drawn and payable in Ecuador must be
presented for payment within the term of twenty days, counted
from the date of their issuance. Those checks drawn in the exte-
rior [outside of Ecuador] and payable in Ecuador must be
presented for payment within the term of ninety days, counted
from the date of their issuance.
Those checks drawn in Ecuador and payable in the exterior
[outside of Ecuador] shall be subject, for presentment for pay-
ment, to the terms or times determined by the law of the state
where the drawee bank has its domicile.1
4 0
Colombia has yet another method of dealing with the
question:
Checks must be presented for their payment:
1) Within fifteen days from their date, if they are payable in the
same place as of its issuance;
2) Within one month, if they are payable in the same country of
their issuance, but in a different place in it;
3) Within three months, if they are issued in one Latin Ameri-
can country and payable in another Latin American country;
and
4) Within four months, if they are issued in any Latin American
country for payment outside of Latin America."'
Colombia's omission of any mention of its Canadian and United
States neighbors to its north seems to be a studied one.
The Geneva Check Convention provides that:
A cheque payable in the country in which it was issued
must be presented for payment within eight days.
A cheque issued in a country other than that in which it is
payable must be presented within a period of twenty days or of
seventy days, according as to whether the place of issue and the
place of payment are situated respectively in the same continent
or in different continents.
339. C6DIGO Dz Comzmclo, Tltulo XIII, Cap. III, art. 25 (Argentina).
340. LY DR CHEQuEs, art. 25.
341. C6DIGo DE ComEacio, art. 718 (Colombia).
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For the purposes of this article cheques issued in a Euro-
pean country and payable in a country bordering on the Medi-
terranean or vice versa are regarded as issued and payable in the
same continent.
The date from which the above-mentioned periods of time
shall begin to run shall be the date stated on the cheque as the
date of issue."4
For some unexplained reason, the draftsmen of the UN Check
Convention have turned away from this tradition of making time
allowances for geographical differences, and, under that conven-
tion, a "cheque must be presented for payment within 120 days of
its date.
'3 43
V. Installment and Interest Bearing Instruments
It is a common practice in the United States for promissory
notes to bear interest and to be payable in installments. It is also
possible, although less common, for bills of exchange to provide for
installment payments bearing interest charges. Section 3-106 of the
UCC seems to offer numerous possible combinations of interest
and installment payments. The comparable provision in the En-
glish Bills of Exchange Act is not as broad as the UCC, but does
permit payment in installments and the payment of interest. " '
The Geneva Draft Convention illustrates a sharp turning away
from the Anglo-American practice:
When a bill of exchange is payable at sight, or at a fixed
period after sight, the drawer may stipulate that the sum paya-
ble shall bear interest. In the case of any other bill of exchange,
this stipulation is deemed not to be written (non-6crite).
The rate of interest must be specified in the bill; in default
of such specification, the stipulation shall be deemed not to be
written (non-kcrite). Interest runs from the date of the bill of
exchange unless some other date is specified.
3 4
5
It seems somewhat strange that drafts which have an indetermi-
nate maturity date are allowed to bear interest, while those instru-
ments with a fixed maturity date are not. In any event, the same
342. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 29.
343. U.N. Check Convention, art. 43(b).
344. Bills of Exchange Act, § 9.
345. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 5.
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convention provides a similar rule for promissory notes."' e The Ge-
neva Check Convention succinctly states that "[a]ny stipulation
concerning interest which may be embodied in the cheque shall be
disregarded."
'8 4'
Regarding installment payments of principal, the Geneva
Draft Convention provides that bills of exchange may be payable
at sight, at a fixed period after sight, at a fixed period after date or
at a fixed date. "Bills of exchange at other maturities or payable by
installments are null and void. '3 48 The same rule prevails for
promissory notes.'
The UN Draft Convention reflects a turning away from the
Geneva Convention, with a broad swing back to the Anglo-Ameri-
can view.
The sum payable by a instrument is deemed to be a definite
sum although the instrument states that it is to be paid:
(a) with interest;
(b) by installments at successive dates;
(c) by installments at successive dates with the stipulation on
the instrument that upon default in payment of any install-
ment the unpaid balance becomes due."'0
The commentary notes that the above proposed rules "respond to
the majority view expressed by banking and trade circles that it
would be desirable. . . to permit the drawing or making of instru-
ments containing a stipulation of interest or with successive matur-
ity dates."' " Under this proposed rule, it must be noted that the
rate of interest has to be stated because the mere mention of inter-
est without a stated rate "is deemed not to have been written."5 2
Further, the monetary amount of each installment must be speci-
fied on the face of the instrument.353 The Draftsmen of the UN
Check Convention have reaffirmed the old rule that any "stipula-
tion on a cheque that it is to be paid with interest is deemed not to
346. Id., art 77.
347. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 7.
348. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 33.
349. Id., art. 77.
350. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 6.
351. Id., art. 6 commentary at 2.
352. Id., art. 7(4).
353. Id., arts. 1(2)(b) and 6(b).
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have been written. 8154
Although "banking and trade circles" might like the notions of
installment payments and the payment of interest, the current leg-
islation in much of Latin America is to the contrary. For example,
in El Salvador, bills of exchange with "successive maturities" are
null" and the stipulation of interest is invalid.3" Interest on bills
of exchange is outlawed in Mexico, 57 while instruments with suc-
cessive maturities "shall always be understood as payable on sight
for the totality of the sum which it expresses.""' This rule that the
total amount of the bill is payable on sight is a harsh sanction.
Venezuela follows the Geneva Convention and allows interest
on bills of exchange which are payable at sight or at a certain time
after sight, but outlaws interest on other bills.859 Installment pay-
ments are again forbidden.860 Like Mexico, Guatemala provides
that if the draft calls for installment payments, it shall be payable
at sight.861 Unlike Mexico, Guatemala allows interest on sight
drafts and those drafts which are payable at a set number of days
after sight.
8 62
Ecuador also forbids installment payments on bills of ex-
change868 and in promissory notes.3" Sight drafts and drafts paya-
ble at a certain time after sight, however, may carry interest. If the
amount of interest is not specified, it is five per cent per annum.,6
Argentina is in accord with Ecuador and allows interest on sight
drafts, but, if the interest rate is not specified, the clause shall not
be considered written.8" Installment payment drafts are also null
in Argentina."6
Colombia, as distinguished from the other Latin American
countries surveyed in this article, provides that the "bill of ex-
change may contain interest clauses and exchange clauses at a
354. U.N. Check Convention, art. 9.
355. C6IoGO DE Comzscio, art. 706 (El Salvador).
356. Id., art. 704.
357. LEY GENERAL, art. 78.
358. Id., art. 79.
359. C6DIGO DE COME cio, art. 414 (Venezuela).
360. Id., art. 441.
361. C6DIGO DE CoMERcio, art. 443 (Guatemala).
362. Id., art. 442.
363. C6DIGO DP CoME cio, art. 441 (Ecuador).
364. Id., art. 488.
365. Id., art. 414.
366. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, Titulo X. Cap. 1, art. 5 (Argentina).
367. Id., Cap. V, art. 35.
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fixed or current rate. 368 In a consistent vein, the bill may be paya-
ble "[wJith successive certain maturities. '" s3
W. The Drawer Who Draws Without Recourse
In the United States, a drawer of a bill of exchange promises
-that upon dishonor of the draft and notice of dishonor, he will pay
the draft to the holder. However, "[tihe drawer may disclaim this
liability by drawing without recourse. 370 The comments to this
section do not state that the disclaiming wording must be in writ-
ing, although the section heavily implies such a requirement by us-
ing the word "drawing." The comments to the section, dealing with
an indorsement without recourse, emphasize that the disclaimer
"without recourse" must be in writing.371 This notion of "without
recourse" drawing can be traced back to the former NIL.3 12 Under
the English Bills of Exchange Act, the "drawer of a bill, and any
indorser, may insert therein an express stipulation-(1) Negativing
or limiting his own liability to the holder.
'3 73
The Geneva Bills of Exchange Convention tersely deals with
this subject: "[T]he drawer guarantees both acceptance and pay-
ment. He may release himself from guaranteeing acceptance; every
stipulation by which he releases himself from the guarantee of pay-
ment is deemed not to be written (non-crite).
3 74
The above clause is part of the law in Argentina 75 and Guate-
mala.37e In El Salvador,3 7 7 Mexico 378 and Colombia,3 7 9 the drawer
cannot exclude his liability for both acceptance and payment. Ec-
uador s8 and Venezuela" 1 follow the Geneva model, but without
adopting the specific language used.
In spite of the common adoption of the rule that a drawer can-
368. CoDI, O° DE COMEIWIO, art. 672 (Colombia).
369. Id., art. 673(3).
370. U.C.C. § 3-413(2).
371. U.C.C. § 3-414, comment 1.
372. N.I.L., supra note 88, § 61.
373. Bills of Exchange Act, § 16(1).
374. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 9.
375. C6DIGO DE CoumEcio, Titulo X, Cap. I, art. 10 (Argentina).
376. C6DIGO DE COMC1O, art. 449 (Guatemala).
377. C6DIGO DE COMERCio, art. 711 (El Salvador).
378. LEY GENERAL, art. 87.
379. C6DIGO DE ComEcio, art. 678 (Colombia).
380. C6DIGO DE Cosxscio, art. 418 (Ecuador).
381. CMDIGO DE ComExcio, art. 418 (Venezuela).
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not (at the very least) exonerate himself from liability for payment
in the event that the drawer fails to pay, the UN Draft Convention
adopts the view that the "drawer may exclude or limit his own lia-
bility by an express stipulation on the bill. Such stipulation has
effect only with respect to the drawer." '882 In addition to this dras-
tic change, a commentary to this section says it:
deals only with a stipulation made expressly on the bill. It does
not prevent a drawer from excluding or limiting his liability by
an agreement outside the bill; in such a case he may invoke the
exclusion or limitation as a defence against a holder in accor-
dance with article 25(1) unless that holder is a protected
holder .... ,3
This commentary apparently encourages the use of parol testi-
mony against holders who allegedly know of the extraneous dis-
claimer of liability. Encouraging the use of parol testimony is again
advanced in a subsequent article which states that "[t]he maker
may not exclude or limit his own liability by a stipulation on the
note. Any such stipulation is without effect."' " A commentary to
this article repeats language similar to that regarding the drawer,
and again allows the use of parol testimony to directly contradict a
positive prohibition in the Draft Convention.388 This is a strange
way of drafting a treaty.
X. Bearer Instruments and Special Indorsements
The UCC states that a "special indorsement specifies the per-
son to whom or to whose order it makes the instrument payable.
Any instrument specially indorsed becomes payable to the order of
the special indorsee and may be further negotiated only by his in-
dorsement." 8 ' Under this section, an instrument which is payable
to bearer on the face can be specially indorsed. Further, negotia-
tion then requires the indorsement of the special indorsee. The pa-
per is no longer negotiable by mere delivery. 8 7 The UCC reversed
the NIL rule that when "an instrument payable to bearer, is in-
dorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by de-
382. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 34.
383. Id., at commentary 7.
384. Id., art. 35(2).
385. Id., at commentary 4.
386. U.C.C. § 3-204(1).
387. Id., official comment.
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livery."388 The English Bills of Exchange Act succinctly states the
same rule: "[a] bill payable to bearer is negotiated by delivery."' 8 '
The whole problem is neatly avoided in the Geneva Draft
Convention which provides for the issuance of instruments stating
the "name of the person to whom or to whose order payment is to
be made."390 The Geneva Check Convention authorizes the use of
bearer checks.89 1 It then seemingly follows the British view that an
"endorsement on a cheque to bearer renders the endorser liable in
accordance with the provisions governing the right of recourse; but
it does not convert the instrument into a cheque to order." 8 2
The UN Draft Convention again disallows drafts and notes
payable to bearer. 93 The UN Check Convention authorizes checks
made payable to bearer,'9 and states that a transfer is made "by
mere delivery of the cheque if it is drawn payable to bearer [em-
phasis added] or if the last endorsement is in blank."398 The itali-
cized words seem to say "bearer paper is always bearer paper." An-
other article states that a "person is a holder if he is: (a) in
possession of a cheque drawn payable to bearer."39 In spite of this
attention to bearer checks, the author has not found any other ar-
ticle which clearly covers this problem. A commentary states, how-
ever, that "[iut should be noted that a special endorsement of a
cheque made payable to bearer does not convert the cheque into
an order instrument. Thus, a bearer cheque with such a special
endorsement may be transferred by a mere delivery. ''139
El Salvador prohibits the use of drafts made payable to
bearer.3 98 The same rule prevails as to promissory notes.399 Bearer
checks are permitted in El Salvador, e0 but the law seemingly fails
to deal with the problem of a subsequent indorsement to a special
indorsee. Contrary to the common civilian rule, bearer drafts are
388. N.I.L., supra note 88, § 40.
389. Bills of Exchange Act, § 31(2).
390. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 1(6).
391. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 5.
392. Id., art. 20.
393. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 1 §§ (2)(b), (3)(b), commentary at 8.
394. U.N. Check Convention, art. 1(2)(b).
395. Id., art. 14(b).
396. Id., art. 16(1)(a).
397. Id., art. 17 commentary at 2.
398. C6DIGO DE Coiaacio, art. 705 (El Salvador).
399. Id., art. 792.
400. Id., arts. 793(V), 797, 800.
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authorized in Colombia.40 1 The Colombian law deals with the prob-
lem, by stating that the "holder of a negotiable instrument (titulo-
valor) may not change the form of circulation without the consent
of the creator of the instrument."'402
Argentina fits within the civilian mold by requiring that
drafts 03 and promissory notes be payable to order. 44 Argentine
checks may be issued to bearer, 05 but the law follows the Geneva
Check Convention and states that the indorsement of a bearer
check does not "convert the instrument into a check to order."' 6
The Guatemalan draft must also be made payable to order,4'"
and the law is consistent for promissory notes.' a Checks can be
issued to order or to bearer.'0 9 Guatemala's general rules governing
negotiable instruments (titulos de credito) contain a rule similar to
that of Colombia: "[t]he holder of a negotiable instrument may not
change the form of circulation without consent of the emitter [is-
suer], except for legal dispositions to the contrary."'' 0 Venezuela
disallows bearer drafts"" and promissory notes,'41 but does permit
bearer checks,"13 without providing for the effects of a special
indorsement.
Mexico positively forbids bearer drafts4 '4 and notes,"' while
permitting bearer checks."16 Mexico, like Guatemala and Colombia,
prevents the holder from changing the form of circulation from
bearer to order paper without the consent of the issuer. The Mexi-
can versi6n is more clearly phrased than the laws of the other two
countries. The text of the provision refers to registered (nomina-
tive) and bearer paper." 7
401. C6DIGO DE COMcio, art. 671(4) (Colombia).
402. Id., art. 630.
403. C6DIG0 DE COMmRC10, Titulo X, Cap. I, art. 1(6). (Argentina).
404. Id., Titulo XI, Cap. I, art. 101(5).
405. Id., Titulo XIII, Cap. I, arts. 2(5), 2(6).
406. Id., Cap. II, art. 18.
407. C6DMGO DE COMEECio, art. 447 (Guatemala).
408. Id., art. 490.
409. Id., art. 497.
410. Id., art. 392.
411. C6Dmo DE ComEacto, art. 410(6) (Venezuela).
412. Id., art. 486.
413. Id., art. 490.
414. Liy GE.NRAzL, art. 88.
415. Id., art. 174.
416. Id., art. 179.
417. Id., art. 21.
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Ecuador also disapproves of bearer drafts"" and promissory
notes.'19 Bearer checks are recognized there, 20 and Ecuador like
Argentina, follows the Geneva Check Convention by providing that
the indorsement of a bearer check does not convert it into an order
instrument.421 .
Y. Restrictive Indorsements for Collection
A troubling obstacle to the unification of the civilian and
American systems is the disparate treatment of the restrictive in-
dorsement for collection. The UCC states:
Except for an intermediary bank, any transferee under an
indorsement which .... includes the terms 'for collection', 'for
deposit', 'pay any bank', or like terms . . . must pay or apply
any value given by him for or on the security of the instrument
consistently with the indorsement.2'
If the indorsee does apply any value consistently with the indorse-
ment, he/she can be a holder in due course if he/she is otherwise in
good faith and without knowledge of any defense or claim to the
instrument.'2 s
Under this approach, if a payee deposits his check in his/her
depositary bank under a "for deposit only" indorsement and the
depositary allows the depositor to withdraw funds before the check
is paid by the payor-drawee bank, the depositary bank may be-
come a holder for value. If the bank is in good faith and is without
knowledge of any defense or claim, it can then claim to be a holder
in due course and enforce the check against the drawer if he stops
payment on it.4' " Even if the depositor forgets to indorse the
check, the bank is authorized to indorse it for him/her and, again,
if the bank acts consistently with the indorsement it can be a
holder for value. "12
This provision in the UCC is new. It reverses the view, under
the NIL, that a restrictive indorsement to a bank or other agent
418. C6DIGO DE COMERCiO, art. 410(6) (Ecuador).
419. Id., art. 486(5).
420. LEY DE CHEQUES, art. 5.
421. Id., art. 19.
422. U.C.C. § 3-206(3).
423. Id.
424. Pazol v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Sandy Springs, 110 Ga. App. 319, 138 S.E.2d 442
(1964).
425. U.C.C. § 4-205.
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for collection destroys negotiability so that no one can be a holder
thereafter.' 26 The cases are split as to this result.'"7
The NIL rule, of course, was derived from the English source:
(1) An indorsement is restrictive which prohibits the further
negotiation of the bill or which expresses that it is a mere au-
thority to deal with the bill as thereby directed and not a trans-
fer of the ownership thereof, as, for example, if a bill be in-
dorsed "Pay D only," or "Pay D for the account of X," or "Pay
D or order for collection."
(2) A restrictive indorsement gives the indorsee the right to
receive payment of the bill and to sue any party thereto that his
indorser could have sued, but gives him no power to transfer his
rights as indorsee unless it expressly authorises him to do so.
(3) Where a restrictive indorsement authorises further
transfer, all subsequent indorsees take the bill with the same
rights and subject to the same liabilities as the first indorsee
under the restrictive indorsement.4*
8
The English law then clearly destroys negotiability: "(1) Where a
bill is negotiable in its origin it continues to be negotiable until it
has been (a) restrictively indorsed or (b) discharged by payment or
otherwise."'"' Under these provisions, the restrictive indorsement
prevents negotiation, in the sense of a transferee becoming a
holder in due course, but does not prevent a transfer of the paper.
One view of the old pre-UCC rule is exemplified by article 23
of the Geneva Check Convention:
When an endorsement contains the statement "value in col-
lection" . . . "for collection", . . . or any other phrase implying
a simple mandate, the holder may exercise all rights arising out
of the cheque, but he can endorse it only in his capacity as
agent.
In this case the parties liable can only set up against the
holder defenses which could be set up against the endorser.
Under this Geneva wording, the agent for collection (such as a
bank) has all the rights of its depositor insofar as proceeding
against prior parties (such as the drawer) but cannot acquire
426. Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N.Y. 223, 14 N.E.2d 46 (1938).
427. W.E. BRrrroN, BILLS AND NoTEs, 152-165 (5th ed. 1961).
428. Bills of Exchange Act, § 35.
429. Id., § 36(1).
1983]
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
holder in due course status.
The UN Check Convention has repeated much of the language
of the Geneva Convention:
(1) When an endorsement contains the words "for collec-
tion", "for deposit", "value in collection", "by procuration",
"pay any bank", or words of similar import, authorizing the en-
dorsee to collect the cheque (endorsement for collection), the
endorsee:
(a) May only endorse the cheque for purposes of collection;
(b) May exercise all the rights arising out of the cheque;
(c) Is subject to all claims and defences which may be set up
against the endorser.
(2) The endorser for collection is not liable upon the cheque
to any subsequent holder.
4a0
A commentary to this section points out that if a payee in-
dorses the note "for collection" to A and A fraudulently transfers
the check to B and B is refused payment by the drawee-bank, B
has no cause of action against the payee. "In that respect, an en-
dorsement for collection resembles an endorsement 'without re-
course'."'' The same commentary also notes that if the drawer has
a defense which is good against the payee, it is also good against
the holder for collection. Under the UCC, the holder for collection
can, as previously noted, acquire holder in due course status and
prevail over the drawer.
One further commentary deserves analysis:
The endorsee for collection cannot be a protected holder in
his own right. However, if the endorser for collection is a pro-
tected holder, the transfer of the cheque to the agent for collec-
tion vests in him the rights on and to the cheque which the pro-
tected holder had (article 29). It follows that the endorsee for
collection is subject only to those claims and defenses which
may be set up against the endorser.
431
It is submitted that this commentary is really irrelevant and
adds a complication which is not needed in light of the operation
of the proposed rule. Under the proposed rule, the agent for collec-
430. U.N. Check Convention, art. 22.
431. Id., commentary at 2, example A.
432. Id., commentary at 3(c).
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tion "is subject to all claims and defences which may be set up
against the endorser." If the endorser is a "protected holder," most
defenses or claims cannot be asserted against the endorser, and,
therefore, the same claims and defenses cannot be asserted against
the indorsee for collection. The issue is not resolved by bringing in
the property concept that a holder from a holder in due course is a
holder in due course. Rather, the problem is an agency one which
is solved by the proposed rule. This proposed agency rule would be
effective in a country which refuses to follow the so-called "shelter
principle."
Argentina,'13 Mexico' 3 ' and El Salvador'3 5 adopt the language
of the Geneva Draft Convention. This language includes the rule
that neither the death nor subsequent incapacity of the principal
revokes the authority of the agent for collection. Guatemala pro-
vides for the collection indorsement, but makes no mention that
the agent for collection is subject only to defenses which can be
raised against his principle.'3 6 Venezuela tracks the language of the
Geneva Draft Convention, but makes no statement regarding the
subsequent death or incapacity of the principle.' 37 Ecuador, in its
separate treatment of checks and drafts, appears somewhat incon-
sistent. The indorsement for collection of checks does not termi-
nate because of subsequent death or incompetency."8 No mention
of this is made, however, in the "agent for collection indorsement"
article dealing with bills of exchange.
439
Colombia follows concepts which are similar to those followed
by the above countries. Nevertheless, it adds the thought that if
the indorser revokes the authority contained in the indorsement,
he must give the debtor notice of the revocation if the revocation is
not contained in the instrument or in a judicial proceeding for en-
forcement of the instrument. If the debtor pays while ignorant of
the revocation, his payment is valid."4
0
433. C6Dnco DR COMERCiO, Titulo X, Cap. II, art. 19 (Argentina).
434. L.y GENERAL, art. 35.
435. C6DIGO DE COMEaClO, art. 669 (El Salvador).
436. Ctmio ia COMERCiO, art. 427 (Guatemala).
437. C6DIGo DE COMERCIO, art. 426 (Venezuela).
438. LEY DE CHEQUES, art. 22.
439. C6DIO DE COMERCIO, art. 426 (Ecuador).
440. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 658 (Colombia).
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Z. Optional Presentment for Acceptance of Drafts
It is familiar practice in the United States for a holder of a bill
of exchange that has a fixed date of payment to present it for ac-
ceptance at an earlier date, in order to determine whether the
drawee is going to pay it at maturity." 1 In the event that the
holder's optional presentment for acceptance is refused, then the
holder must treat this refusal as a dishonor and give notice to prior
parties.442 The English law on this point is not entirely clear.4 " a
The UCC does not contain any explicit provision giving the
drawer the right to stipulate in the draft that it either must not be,
or cannot be, presented for acceptance before a specific date or
before the occurrence of some specified event. It appears that
under the wording of section 3-503, however, these results can be
achieved: "Unless a different time is expressed in the instrument
the time for any presentment is determined as follows: (a) where
an instrument is payable at a fixed period after a stated date any
presentment for acceptance must be made on or before the date it
is payable."
The Geneva Draft Convention permits the drawer (except in
the case of a bill payable at the address of a third party or in a
locality other than the domicile of the drawee, or of a bill payable
at a fixed period after sight) to forbid prior presentment for ac-
ceptance, or to stipulate that presentment for acceptance shall not
be made before a stated date."
In a rare recognition of the commercial practice in Latin
America, the draftsmen of the UN Draft Convention have articu-
lated the following rule:
Notwithstanding the provisions of article 45 [which deals
with both optional and mandatory presentment for acceptance]
the drawer may stipulate on the bill that it must not be
presented for acceptance or that it must not be so presented
before a specified date or before the occurrence of a specified
event." 8
The provision goes on to state that it is not a dishonor if present-
441. U.C.C. § 3-501(1)(a).
442. U.C.C. §§ 3-507(I)(a) & (2).
443. BLEs, supra note 77, at 87.
444. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 22.
445. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 46.
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ment is made in spite of a prohibition and is refused. If the drawee
accepts in spite of the prohibition, however, it is an effective
acceptance.
The commentary is well worth quoting extensively:
Inquiries amongst banking and trade institutions have
shown that stipulations requesting the holder not to present the
bill before the occurrence of a specified event occur not infre-
quently. In some countries, particularly Latin American, it ap-
pears to be normal practice to delay presentment until the mer-
chandise has arrived or (in some African countries) until after
customs clearance. In some countries, drawees often refuse to
accept documentary bills on the ground that the carrying vessel
has not yet reached its destination point, and a bill may there-
fore direct a holder not to present it for acceptance until the
vessel has arrived."
Another commentary notes that in the event that a vessel should
be shipwrecked, for example, then presentment for acceptance as
directed by the stipulation is dispensed with, and under articles
48(b) and 50(1)(b) the holder has an immediate right of recourse
against the drawer and any prior indorsers."
7
Argentina is in accord with the UN Draft Convention, but
adds that unless the drawer has stipulated that the draft must not
be accepted, any indorser may write on the draft that it must be
accepted "indicating or not indicating a term for this effect."'
Venezuela's law agrees.4, 9 In Guatemala, the "drawer. . . may pro-
hibit the presentment of the bill of exchange before a determined
date.' 84 Similarly, the El Salvadorian drawer may prohibit presen-
tation for acceptance before a determin 3d date which is specifically
spelled out in the draft.8 In Ecuador, the drawer may: 1) stipulate
in the bill of exchange that it must be presented for acceptance; 2)
prohibit presentment for acceptance (unless the bill is domiciled or
payable a certain time after sight); or, 3) stipulate that the bill
may not be presented before a determined date. Any indorser may
stipulate that the draft must be presented for acceptance (with or
without fixing a date for presentment) unless the drawer has stipu-
446. Id., commentary at 2.
447. Id., commentary at 3.
448. C6DIGO DE COMERCIo, Titulo X, Cap. I1, art. 24 (Argentina).
449. C6DIGO DE Cojascio, art. 430 (Venezuela).
450. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 451 (Guatemala).
451. C6DIoo DE Comaitco, arts. 716, 717 (El Salvador).
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lated that the draft is not subject to acceptance.45
In Mexico:
The presentment of bills of exchange drawn payable at a
fixed date or a certain time after date shall be optional, unless
the drawer has made it obligatory with writing or determined
time for the presentment, consigning expressly in the bill of ex-
change this circumstance. This drawer may likewise prohibit
presentment before a determined date, consigning it thusly in
the bill. When the presentment of the bill is optional, the holder
may make it not later than the last day before maturity."5 3
The Colombian law on optional presentment and the prohibition
of presentment is similar to the Mexican law.'"
AA. Certified Checks
In the United States, a drawer or payee of a check may re-
quest the drawee bank to certify the check. If the bank consents (it
is normally optional)' 55 to the payee's request 45 6 the drawer is dis-
charged. Conversely, where the drawer has the check certified, the
drawer remains liable.
When the bank certifies the check, it "engages" that it will
make payment "according to its tenor at the time of his engage-
ment.' 54 7 It also "admits as against all subsequent parties . . . the
existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.' 4 58 Under
these principles, if a possessor of a check erases the name of the
real payee and inserts his own or an assumed name, then increases
the amount of the check and has it certified, the bank is liable to a
holder in due course who took from the dishonest possessor. This
occurs because the bank promises to pay according to the tenor of
the check and admits the existence of the payee (real or assumed)
and his then capacity to indorse. 5'
The certification of a check in the United States does not ne-
452. C6DIGO DE COMERCio, art. 430 (Ecuador).
453. LEY GENERAL, art. 94.
454. C6rnGo DE Coauscto, art. 681 (Colombia).
455. U.C.C. § 3-411 (2).
456. Id., § 3-411(1).
457. Id., § 3-413(1).
458. Id., § 3-413(3).
459. See U.C.C. § 3-417 comment 5 which adopts the holding of Wells Fargo Bank &
Union Trust Company v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4 P.2d 781 (1931).
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gate its negotiability. If certification has any effect, it increases the
check's marketability because the promise of a bank is "behind"
the check. Somewhat surprisingly, the certification procedure is
rarely used in England, except for the limited purpose of paying
checks through a clearing house by non-member banks.'10
The rejection of the idea and use of certified checks is even
more pronounced in the Geneva Check Convention which states
that a "cheque cannot be accepted. A statement of acceptance of a
cheque shall be disregarded."' 6
The UN Check Convention takes another waffling position:
(1) Any statement written on a cheque indicating certifica-
tion, confirmation, acceptance, visa or any other equivalent ex-
pression has only the effect to ascertain the existence of funds
and prevents the withdrawal of such funds by the drawer, or the
use of such funds by the drawer, or the use of such funds by the
drawee for purposes other than payment of the cheque bearing
such a statement, before the expiration of the time-limit for
presentment.
(2) However, a Contracting State may provide that a drawee
may accept a cheque and determine the legal effects thereof.
Such acceptance must be effected by the signature of the drawee
accompanied by the word "accepted"."'
The commentary to this section states that subsection one creates
an "irrebuttable presumption" that the statement "does no more
than ascertain the existence of funds in the hands of the drawee-
bank."'s 8 The drawee, by accepting, precludes itself from using the
funds for a set-off against other debts owed to the drawee by the
drawer. It also prevents the drawer from withdrawing these funds
before the 120 day period for the presentment for payment has
elapsed. "8' A final commentary to this section notes that in "view
of the widespread practice of confirming cheques under the UCC,
paragraph (2) placed between brackets, permits a Contracting
State to provide for the acceptance of an international cheque and
to determine the legal effects thereof.""'
The draftsmen of the UN Check Convention, by stressing the
460. BvLxs, supra note 77, at 243, n.44.
461. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 4.
462. U.N. Check Convention, art. 36.
463. Id., commentary at 2.
464. Id.
465. Id., commentary at 3.
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use of certified checks under the UCC, seem to show an ignorance
of the widespread legislative approval of certified checks in Latin
American countries. One of the most complete articulations of the
Latin American approach is found in the Argentine Check Law:
The bank may certify or conform (conformar) a check, at the
request of the drawer or of any holder, previously verifying that
there exists sufficient funds in the account of the drawer, debit-
ing, at the same time the sum necessary to pay it.
The amount thus debited shall remain to be paid to whom
it belongs and withdrawing (sustraido) from all of the contin-
gencies which originate from the person or solvency of the
drawer, like that of his death, incapacity, bankruptcy, civil insol-
vency proceedings or judicial attachment, after the certification,
shall not affect the provision [of the funds certified], or the right
of the holder of the check, or the correlative obligation of the
bank to make cash payment when it is presented for collection.
The certification may not be partial nor written on checks
to bearer. The insertion on the check of the words "accepted"
"approved [visto]", "good", or other analogous subscriptions by
the drawee are equivalent to a certification.
The certification has the effects to establish the existence of
the funds and to impede their withdrawal by the drawer during
the agreed period.'"
The Argentine law then goes on to state:
The certification may be made for a contractual period which
may not exceed five business days; and if at the maturity of the
check it has not been collected, the bank shall credit the account
of the drawer for the sum which was reserved.
The certified check which has come due shall subsist with
all of the proper effects of the check legislated in the chapters
prior to the present one."'
The Mexican law is much more restrictive than the Argentine
law. Only the drawer can request that the bank certify the check
before its issuance. Further, the certified check is not negotiable,
and can be revoked by the drawer if he returns it for
cancellation. 6 8
The El Salvadorian law seems to be in accord with the Mexi-
466. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, TMtulo XIII, Cap. III, art. 24 (Argentina).
467. Id., art. 49.
468. LEY GENERAL, art. 199.
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can law, but adds that the drawer and indorsers are relieved from
liability by the certification."69 Guatemalan law disagrees with that
of Mexico regarding the drawer's ability to cancel the certified
check, but does provide for cancellation of the check upon the
drawer's return of the check to the drawee-bank. 4'70 Ecuador's legal
treatment of the certified check closely resembles the Mexican, El
Salvadorian and Guatemalan provisions, but adds that since the
certified check is non-negotiable, the "beneficiary may make pay-
ment directly or by means of a bank.'
471
Colombia, like Argentina, permits certification at the request
of either the drawer or holder, but unlike Argentina states that the
drawer and all indorsers are freed from responsibility by virtue of
the certification.7 2 The Colombian drawer may not revoke the cer-
tified check before the time for presentation elapses (fifteen days if
the check is drawn and payable in the same place in Colombia).47"
BB. Post-Dated Checks
The UN Draft Check Convention states in article 11:
(1) A cheque is always payable on demand. It is so payable:
(a) If it states that it is payable at sight or on demand or
presentment or if it contains words of similar import; or
(b) If no time of payment is expressed.
(2) A stipulation on a cheque that it is payable at a definite time
is deemed not to have been written.
At first blush, the above provision seems to forbid the use of post-
dated checks. A much later provision, however, states that if "a
check is presented before its stated date, refusal by the drawee to
pay does not constitute dishonor by non-payment under article
46". 4' The commentary to this article then notes that article 11 is
designed to cover post-dated checks and that the bank's refusal to
pay does not constitute a dishonor. It appears under articles 11
and 47, that post-dated checks are permitted, and that a bank may
pay upon presentment, in spite of the post-date, without liability
469. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 825 (El Salvador).
470. C61oO DE COMERCio, art. 5 (Guatemala).
471. LEY DE CHEQUES, art. 37; see also id., arts. 36, 38-40.
472. C6DIGO DE CoMEacio, art. 739 (Colombia).
473. Id., art. 742.
474. U.N. Check Convention, art. 47.
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attaching to the drawer. In short, these UN check provisions re-
semble a blend of the UCC, which authorizes post-dated checks
and makes their premature payment wrongful as to the drawer
(under section 4-401), with some parochial state provisions which
protect a bank which pays ahead of the stated date, unless the
drawer informs the bank in writing of the details of the post-dated
check prior to payment.
7 6
The UN Check Convention's position regarding post-dated
checks shows a turning away from the Geneva Check Convention.
The Geneva Convention states that a "cheque is payable at sight.
Any contrary stipulation shall be disregarded. A cheque presented
for payment before the date stated as the date of issue is payable
on the day of presentment.'
' 7
1
All seven Latin countries under discussion have adopted the
Geneva Check Convention's provision, at least in concept. In Ar-
gentina, for example, the:
check is payable at sight. Any contrary mention shall be taken
as not written. The check presented for payment before the date
indicated as the date of issuance shall be paid on the day of
presentment, there being applicable to it the legal dispositions,
judicial and administrative, relative to the issuance of checks
without provision of funds.
4 77
Guatemala follows virtually the same wording, but adds that when
the check is post-dated or issued without a date, then, in "these
cases the day of presentment shall be taken legally as the date of
its creation. 47 8 In El Salvador every check shall be paid at its pre-
sentment, even when it appears with a later date. In this case, the
bank remains exempt from all responsibility for the payment.
79
Mexican law closely follows the Argentine approach. 4 0 In Ecuador,
the "check presented for payment before the day indicated as the
date of issuance, must be paid or protested. 4 8 1 Post-dated checks
in Colombia are payable upon presentment. 482 Venezuela's ap-
proach is the most unusual. The check "may be payable at sight or
475. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.64 (West Supp. 1983).
476. Geneva Check Convention, art. 28.
477. C6DIGO DE COMERCio, Titulo XIII, Cap.II, art. 23 (Argentina).
478. CbDGO DE CO!ERCcO, art. 401 (Guatemala).
479. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 804 (El Salvador).
480. LEY GENERAL, art. 178.
481. LEY DE CHEQUES, art. 24.
482. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 717 (Colombia).
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in a term no greater than six days from the day of presentment." '8
CC. Stop Orders
Under section 4-403 of the UCC and section 75 of the English
Bill of Exchange Act, the drawee must refuse payment if it is or-
dered to do so by the drawer, provided that adequate and timely
notice is given. A diametrically opposite approach is taken in the
Geneva Check Convention which states that the "countermand of
a cheque only takes effect after the expiration of the limit of time
for presentment."4 8 4 The UN Check Convention follows the Anglo-
American model by providing that "[ijf the drawer countermands
the order to the drawee to pay a cheque drawn by him, the drawee
is under a duty not to pay.'
8 5
Colombia follows the UN Check Convention's approach, and
provides that the "drawer may revoke the check, under his respon-
sibility, even when the time for its presentment has not elapsed,
without prejudice to that disposed in article 742. The revocation
being notified to the bank, it may not pay the check."' 88 Somewhat
surprisingly, article 742 provides that the "drawer may not revoke
the certified check [emphasis added] before the term for present-
ment has elapsed." Article 742 seems to be designed to permit the
drawer to revoke a certified check if he/she is in possession of it.
Only the drawer in possession of the check can stop payment.
Argentina,4 87 and MexicouE also have laws which provide that
the stop-payment order is effective only after the time for present-
ment has expired. In El Salvador, the "[tihe bank shall abstain
from paying the check. . . when the drawer has provided by writ-
ing that payment not be made.' 4 9 That code fails to indicate that
the drawer must have a reason for stopping payment. In contrast,
the law of Ecuador requires the stop order to be in a writing which
states the reason for the revocation. Ecuadorian law also allows the
bearer or holder who loses a check to petition the drawee bank to
suspend payment. The drawee must then retain the amount of the
check until either a judge adjudicates the matter, the drawer
483. C6DIGo DE COMEACIO, art. 490 (Venezuela).
484. Geneva Check Convention, art. 32.
485. U.N. Check Convention, art. 66.
486. C6DIGO DE COMERClo, art. 724 (Colombia).
487. C6DIGO DE CoMERcio, Titulo XIII, Cap. III, art. 29 (Argentina).
488. LEY GENERAL, art. 185.
489. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 817 (El Salvador).
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cancels the revocation, the prescriptive period elapses or the check
is declared void in accordance with the Regulation of the Superin-
tendent of Banks because it was stolen, deteriorated, lost or
destroyed.'90
Venezuela takes a rather dramatic stand against stopping pay-
ment. That law provides that he who frustrates the payment of a
check after he issues it is guilty of a crime, with imprisonment
from one to twelve months, or more if he has committed a criminal
act of fraud.,""
DD. Partial Payments
Section 3-603 of the UCC makes an oblique reference to the
concept of partial payment when it states that the "liability of any
party is discharged to the extent of his payment . . . to the
holder." Comment 3 to the same section states that "[playment to
the holder discharges the party who makes it from his own liability
on the instrument, and a part payment discharges him pro tanto
[emphasis added]." Section 3-604 states that any party "making
tender of full payment to a holder" is discharged to the extent of
all subsequent liability for interest, costs and attorney's fees. This
again recognizes that there is a possibility of partial payment. This
limited treatment of partial payment seems to indicate that a
holder has no duty to accept partial payment, and that acceptance
is purely optional. On the other hand, if the drawee is a bank, an
offer of partial payment necessarily constitutes a disclosure of the
state of the customer's account and a possible invasion of his/her
right of privacy.
4 92
Fortunately, the question of partial payment of checks is not
left unanswered in the UN Check Convention. Under the conven-
tion, the holder is not obliged to take a partial payment. If he does
not take partial payment, the check is dishonored by non-payment.
If the holder accepts partial payment, the check is then considered
to be dishonored as to the unpaid amount. In a similar fashion, if
the holder takes partial payment from a party to the check (other
than the drawee), that party is discharged to the amount paid. The
holder must then give the paying party a certified copy of the
490. LEY DE CHEQUES, art. 27.
491. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 494 (Venezuela).




check and any authenticated protest. The drawee or paying party
may require that a mention of such partial payment be written on
the check and that a receipt be issued to him/her.4" 3 In a consis-
tent vein, when a party is discharged by partial payment to the
extent of payment, any party who has a right of recourse against
him is also discharged to the amount paid. Further, "[playment by
the drawee of the whole or a part of the amount of the cheque to
the holder, or to any party who has paid the cheque in accordance
with article 59, discharges all parties of their liability to the same
extent. ''
4 4
The UN Draft Convention follows the same principles regard-
ing partial payment as those found in the UN Check Conven-
tion.495 It is interesting to note that both the current Geneva Con-
vention on Bills of Exchange and the Geneva Convention on
Checks provide that the holder cannot refuse partial payment.""
This international oscillation between the extremes that a
holder may or may not refuse partial payment, is reflected to a
certain extent in some Latin American countries. In Guatemala,
the holder of a bill of exchange may not refuse the offer of partial
payment.497 On the other hand, the bank must offer partial pay-
ment to the holder of a check if the drawer has insufficient funds
to pay the entire check. If the holder accepts partial payment, a
record is made of the acceptance and the record takes the place of
the check."' As a result, partial payment is mandatory when a
draft is involved, but optional where checks are used.
In Argentina, the law is consistent: holders of drafts and
checks may not refuse partial payment.4" In Venezuela, the holder
of a draft is not obligated to accept partial payment.500 A similar
rule prevails in El Salvador for the holder of a draft501 or a
check. 02 In Mexico, the holder of a draft may not refuse partial
493. U.N. Check Convention, art. 62.
494. Id., art. 67.
495. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 69
496. Geneva Draft Convention Art. 39; Geneva Check Convention, art. 34.
497. C6oIO DE CoMzRco, art. 465 (Guatemala).
498. Id., arts. 504, 506.
499. C6MIo DE CoMERCiO, Titulo X, Cap. VI, art. 42 (drafts);
Id., Titulo XIII, Cap. III. art. 31 (checks) (Argentina).
500. CDIGO DE CoMERCIO, art. 447 (Venezuela).
501. C6DIGO DE CoeaxCIO, art. 736 (El Salvador).
502. Id., art. 814.
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payment, 03 while the holder of a check may refuse a partial pay-
ment.5 4 The holder of a draft in Ecuador may accept or refuse a
partial payment. 0 5 The same rule prevails as to the holder of a
check, "but the drawee bank is obliged to pay the amount of the
check until the total of the funds which it has to the disposition of
the drawer."' 6 The holder of a bill of exchange in Colombia may
not refuse partial payment,507 but if he/she is the holder of a check
he/she may refuse partial payment. 08
EE. Drawer's Death, Incapacity or Bankruptcy
Under section 4-405 of the UCC, neither "death nor incompe-
tency of a customer revokes such authority to accept, pay, collect
or account until the bank knows of the fact of death or of an adju-
dication of incompetency and has reasonable opportunity to act on
it." Further, the bank may pay for certify checks for a period of
ten days after the date of death, even when it has knowledge of the
customer's death. The bank has no grace period, however, when
the customer has been adjudicated incompetent. Although the
UCC makes no provision regarding the bank's duty to either pay or
dishonor when a customer has been adjudicated bankrupt, the cur-
rent Bankruptcy Reform Act 509 provides that the bank must dis-
honor when it learns of the filing of a petition in the bankruptcy
court.
In England, it appears that banks should dishonor checks af-
ter they learn of the death5 10 or incompetency of their customers.
The bank's duty upon the bankruptcy of a customer, however, is
not entirely clear.1 1 The Bills of Exchange Act does not state
whether bankruptcy or incompetency terminates the bank's right
to pay checks.
The UN Check Convention takes no position regarding the
duty of the drawee-bank upon the death, incompetency or bank-
ruptcy of a drawer of a check. This problem may have been consid-
503. LEY GENERAL, art. 130.
504. Id., art. 189.
505. C6Dvo DE COM-RCIo, art. 447 (Ecuador).
506. LEY DE CHEQUES, art. 29.
507. C6DIcO DE COMERcio, art. 693 (Colombia). See also art. 624.
508. Id., art. 727.
509. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1983).
510. Bills of Exchange Act, § 75(2).
511. BYLES, supra note 77, at 247, 392.
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ered to be a parochial one which does not need uniformity. On the
other hand, the draftsmen of the Geneva Check Convention obvi-
ously thought that the problem requires a uniform answer:
"[n]either the death of the drawer nor his incapacity taking place
after the issue of the cheque shall have any effect as regards the
cheque.
5 1
The Geneva provision has been a model for Latin American
codifications. In Guatemala, the "death or incapacity of the
drawer, does not authorize the drawee to forbear to pay the
check. ' 1  The Guatemalan Commercial Code appears to be silent
as to the bank's responsibility when the customer has been de-
clared bankrupt.
In neighboring El Salvador, the death or incapacity of the
drawer does not authorize the drawee-bank to refuse to pay. How-
ever, a judicial declaration of either a state of suspension of pay-
ments, bankruptcy or insolvency obligates the bank to refuse pay-
ment from the time it receives notice.514 Similarly, the death or
supervening incapacity of the Mexican drawer does not authorize
the drawee-bank to refuse to pay the check. Payment must be re-
fused, however, when the bank receives notice that the drawee has
been declared in a state of suspension of payments, bankruptcy or
insolvency proceedings.515 Ecuador adheres to the same view.51 In
Colombia, the bank must refuse to pay its customer's checks in the
event of bankruptcy, insolvency proceedings or judicial or adminis-
trative liquidation of the drawer "from when there has been made
the publication provided by law for these cases.
517
In Argentina, if the check is issued prior to the death of the
drawer or his incompetency, there is no effect on the check. The
bank must, however, refuse payment when it has knowledge of the
death or incompetency of the drawer and the date of the check is
later than the date of either of these events. 18 The drawee bank
must also refuse payment when it has knowledge that the drawer
has been declared bankrupt or is in bankruptcy proceedings prior
to the date of issuance of the check "or that the holder is found in
512. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 33.
513. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 509 (Guatemala).
514. C6DIGo DE COMERCiO, art. 813 (El Salvador).
515. LEY GENERAL, art. 188.
516. LEY DE CnEQUES, art. 28.
517. C6DnIo DE COMERCIO, art. 726 (Colombia).
518. C6DIcO DE COMERCio, Titulo XIII, Cap. III, art. 34(7) (Argentina).
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the same state [of being bankrupt] at the time of presenting the
check for payment." 19 This latter duty appears burdensome for
the payor bank.
FF. Statute of Limitations and Prescriptions
The statute of limitations presents few problems when a payee
sues a maker of a time promissory note since the time begins to
run on the day after maturity. If the note is a demand instrument
the time begins to run from the date appearing on the face of the
instrument or the date of issue, if the instrument is undated.52 0 On
checks and drafts, the cause of action against the drawer and in-
dorsers accrues upon demand following dishonor of the instru-
ment. Notice of dishonor is considered a demand. 21
The latter rule can result in a real problem if one assumes that
a check is issued to the payee who indorses it to A and A then
indorses it to B. B presents it for payment to the drawee, and the
check is dishonored. B notifies all parties of the dishonor. The day
before the expiration of the limitation period (which, of course,
varies from state to state,) B sues A and does not join any other
party to the check as a party defendant. In order to protect him/
herself, B will have to interplead the drawer and the payee in this
action, or file a separate action or actions against these prior par-
ties on the same day that he/she is served. In the real world, this
may be impossible to do, and the total loss may fall upon B. It can
be objected that in this hypothetical, B, after being notified of dis-
honor, should have made him/herself aware of all of the develop-
ments or lack of developments in this matter, and, therefore, is to
blame for his/her own loss. This objection can be countered by the
fact that B might have been lulled into inaction upon the supposi-
tion that he/she was not bothered further because some prior party
had paid A.
Prior to the UCC, many cases held that the statute of limita-
tions begins to run against an indorser, insofar as suing prior in-
dorsers (or the maker or drawer), from the time the indorser pays,
not from the date of maturity of the instrument. Some of these
cases were based upon the notion that the duty of prior indorsers
to pay an aggrieved indorser arises out of an implied promise, not
519. Id., art. 34(6).
520. U.C.C. § 3-122(1).
621. U.C.C. § 3-122(3).
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from the instrument itself, and that, therefore, the time begins to
run only upon payment. Other courts held that the duty of repay-
ment is on the instrument itself, but that the time begins to run
only when the aggrieved indorser pays the holder. 22 The present
language of section 3-122 of the UCC should preclude this ap-
proach, although one should never be sanguine as to what courts
will do when dealing with a statute.52 3
What is needed to protect B in the above hypothetical (or
other parties to an instrument) is some legislative articulation giv-
ing B a period of time to act after he is sued. This protection is
found in the Geneva Draft and Check Conventions. The Geneva
Draft Convention states:
All actions arising out of a bill of exchange against the ac-
ceptor are barred after three years, reckoned from the date of
maturity.
Actions by the holder against the endorsers and against the
drawer are barred after one year from the date of a protest
drawn up within proper time, or from the date of maturity
where there is a stipulation retour sans frais.
Actions by endorsers against each other and against the
drawer are barred after six months, reckoned from the day when
the endorser took up and paid the bill or from the day when he
himself was sued.
2 '
The Geneva Check Convention's limitation section differs from
that of the Geneva Draft Convention:
Actions of recourse by the holder against the endorsers, the
drawer and the other parties liable are barred after six months
as from the expiration of the limit of time fixed for presentment.
Actions of recourse by the different parties liable for the
payment of a cheque against other such parties are barred after
six months as from the day on which the party liable was paid
the cheque or the day on which he was sued thereon.
22e
522. Annotations, 140 A.L.R. 888, 143, A.L.R. 1062. See also Payne v. Payne, 245
S.E.2d 133 (Va. 1978).
523. See Gaflin v. Heymann, 428 A.2d 1066, 32 U.C.C. Rzp. SERv. 176 (R.I. 1981) which
held that a cause of action against an indorser in a suit by the holder began to run only from
the time of demand made upon the indorser. The author has not found any post-U.C.C.
cases involving a sniit by one indorser against another.
524. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 70.
525. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 52.
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If the provision of either of the Geneva Conventions are used to
solve the problem posed at the beginning of this section, when A
sued B, B would have six months to sue the payee and the drawer,
rather than being forced to sue on the same day that he/she was
sued.
Argentina adopts the basic text of the Geneva Draft Conven-
tion with some changes in wording. 6 The six month limitation in
the Geneva Check Convention has been extended to one year in
the Argentine adoption.2 7 Ecuador follows both Geneva Conven-
tions' time limits.
528
In El Salvador, the holder of a draft has three years from the
date of maturity to sue the acceptor and one year from that date to
sue the drawer or prior parties. Any action between prior parties
must also be brought within one year of the voluntary or involun-
tary payment of drafts." ' The El Salvadorian prescription rule for
checks is quite terse:
The exchange actions for the check are prescribed in one year,
counted:
I. From the presentment, of the last holder of the document.
I. From the day following the day on which the check was paid
by the indorsers and guarantors.
3 0
Venezuela follows the Geneva Draft Convention's wording for
drafts,531 but its rule governing time limits for checks is somewhat
unusual:
The possessor of a check which has not been presented in the
times established in the foregoing article and in which payment
has not been demanded at maturity, forfeits his action against
the indorsers. He likewise loses his action against the drawer if
after the passage of the aforesaid times, the amount of the draft
has failed to be available by act of the drawee. 3 2
This latter provision somewhat resembles section 3-502 of the
UCC, which states that the drawer of a check (or, the drawer of
526. C6DIGo DE COMERcio, Titulo X, Cap. XIII, art. 96 (Argentina).
527. Id., Titulo XIII, Cap. X., art. 54.
528. C6Ioo DE CoMERcIo, art. 479 (drafts); LEv DE CHEQUES, art. 50 (Ecuador).
529. C6rnoo DE CoMERCio, arts. 777-78 (El Salvador).
530. Id., art. 820.
531. C6DIoO DE COMERCIO, art. 479 (Venezuela).
532. Id., art. 493.
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any draft) may assign his rights against an insolvent bank to the
holder of a check who has delayed in its presentment, and, to that
extent, the drawer will be discharged.
Mexico follows the six-month period provided in the Geneva
Check Convention,5 88 and the three year period mentioned in the
Geneva Draft Convention.53 Colombia allows for a period of six
months against the drawer and six months for secondary parties,
with the time beginning to run from the date of the secondary par-
ties' payment. 5 '
GG. Late Presentment of Checks and Insolvency of the
Drawee
As indicated in the preceding section, Venezuela apparently
omits any prescription rule for the holder of a check against the
drawer and substitutes a "tardy presentment-damage to drawer"
rule as a substitute. Several other Latin American countries adopt
a modified version of the Venezuelan approach and have both pre-
scriptive periods and a "tardy presentment-damage to drawer"
rule.
In Ecuador for example,
The bearer or holder who does not present the check for pay-
ment within the legal period, shall lose his action against the
indorsers; and [he shall lose his action] against the drawer,
when, having had funds, if they should be lost, after the term
has expired for the bank having declared itself in liquidation. 3'
As mentioned in the preceding section, Ecuador also follows the
Geneva Convention time limits587
The Colombian version of the rule is expressed more clearly:
The exchange action against the drawer and his guarantors
lapses for the check not having been presented and protested on
time, if during all of the period of presentation the drawer had
sufficient funds in the possession of the drawee and, for a cause
not imputable to the drawer, the check was left unpaid. The ex-
change action against the other signatories lapses by the simple
533. LEv GENERAL, art. 192.
534. Id., art. 165.
535. C6DIGo DE Comcio, art. 730 (Colombia).
536. LEY DE CHEQUES, aft. 42.
537. Supra, note 522.
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lack of presentation or opportune protest."'"
The Mexican rule is similar to the Colombian, but the phrasing is
quite different.
5 39
HH. Rights of the Holder Against Prior Parties in Cases of
Late Presentment or Notice of Dishonor
In the preceding section, it was noted that several Latin Amer-
ican countries adopt the "tardy presentment-damage to drawer"
rule. A somewhat similar rule involving indorsers will be discussed
in this section.
Under section 3-802 of the UCC, "discharge of the underlying
obligor on the instrument also discharges him on the obligation."
This rule makes eminently good sense when, in the normal case of
payment, it results in the discharge of a drawer of a check upon
payment of the check by the payor bank or when the maker of a
note pays it at maturity. The rule makes less sense when the in-
strument is discharged, not as a result of payment, but because, for
example, a holder of a check delays presentment for more than
seven days after the indorser negotiates the check to him and the
indorser is then discharged for late presentment."* It also makes
less sense where a holder fails to give timely notice of dishonor to
an indorser of a check or note and the indorser is discharged.54 ' In
these latter cases, the indorser who is discharged may be unjustly
enriched at the expense of the tardy holder.
A fairer approach is advanced in the Geneva Draft and Check
Conventions. The holder is required to notify indorsers, and indor-
sers are required to notify each other; however, "[a] person who
does not give notice within the limit of time . . . does not forfeit
his rights. He is responsible for the injury, if any, caused by his
negligence, but the damages shall not exceed the amount of the bill
of exchange.""54
Argentina adopts a modified version of the Geneva Check
Convention's rule which protects the tardy holder."'8 The compara-
ble terms of the Geneva Draft Convention are also followed in Ar-
538. C6DIoo DE ComZacio, art. 729 (Colombia).
539. LEY GENERAL, art. 191.
540. U.C.C. § 3-503(2)(b).
541. Id., §§ 3-501(2)(a), 3-502, 3-508.
542. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 45; Geneva Check Convention, art. 42.
543. C6DIGO DE ComEacio, Titulo XIII, Cap. IV, art. 39 (Argentina).
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gentina.' Colombia law adopts the view that "[t]he holder who
omits the notice shall be responsible, up to a sum equal to the
amount of the bill of exchange, for the damages and injuries which
are caused by his negligence.""'5 Venezuela also makes the tardy
holder liable for all damages which do not exceed the amount of
the bill of exchange.5'1 The same rule holds true for promissory
notes5 7 and checks." 8 El Salvador requires the notary who
prepares the protest to give notice, and if he fails to do so he will
be liable for damages up to the amount of the bill of exchange. 4'
Mexican law is in accord with similar provisions in El Salvador and
Guatemala which provide that the notary who issues the protest
should notify prior parties, but, it also allows brokers and "first
political authority" to give notice if they issue the protest.6 0 The
party responsible for the delay in giving notice is liable for dam-
ages, and it seems to imply that the tardy holder does not lose his
rights on the bill.551
The UN Draft Convention552 and the UN Check Convention"'3
continue to follow the Geneva Conventions and state: "[flailure to
give notice of dishonour renders a person who is required to give
such notice ... to a party who is entitled to receive such notice
liable for any damages which that party may suffer from such fail-
ure, provided that such damages do not exceed the amount re-
ferred to in article 66 or 67." Articles 66 and 67 generally enable
the holder to recover principal, interest (if provided for in the in-
strument) and the cost of giving notices.
II. Waivers of Protest-Dangers for the Unwary
Under the UCC, a "waiver of protest is also a waiver of pre-
sentment and of notice of dishonor even though protest is not re-
quired." 5" In the United States, protest is required (unless ex-
cused) for any draft drawn or payable outside of the United States,
544. Id., Titulo X, arts. 49, 103.
545. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 707 (Colombia).
54. C6DIGO DE COMEicO, art. 453 (Venezuela).
547. Id., art. 487.
548. Id., art. 491.
549. CoDIoO DE CoaiRcio, art. 763 (El Salvador).
550. LEY GENERAL, art. 155.
551. Id.
552. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 64.
553. U.N. Check Convention, art. 57.
554. U.C.C. § 3-511(5).
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territories, dependencies and possessions of the United States, the
District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 5
This "waiver of protest is also a waiver of presentment and of
notice of dishonor" rule of the United States is a dangerous one
since it is in direct conflict with the law in most other countries. In
England, protest can be waived as can presentment and the giving
of notice of dishonor. Each waiver must be spelled out, and the
waiver of protest does not waive presentment or the giving of no-
tice of dishonor.556 The Geneva Check Convention 557 and the Ge-
neva Draft Convention555 agree that the waiver of protest "does
not release the holder from presenting the cheque within the pre-
scribed limit of time, or from giving the requisite notices."
El Salvadorian law agrees with the two Geneva Draft Conven-
tions. 59 In Guatemala, on the other hand, protest is necessary only
when the drawer of the draft puts the phrase "with protest" on the
face of the draft.560 The fact that protest is not required (unless
the draft calls for it) does not dispense with the presentment for
payment requirement and the necessity of giving notices of dis-
honor.56 , Venezuela, like El Salvador, requires protest, " but pro-
test can be waived, and, if it is, it does not waive presentment or
notice." s Ecuadorian law is consistent with that of Venezuela.
Drafts5 4 and checks are required to be protested, 566 but there does
not seem to be any provision for waiving protest for dishonored
checks.
In Colombia, protest is required only when the issuer or any
holder inserts the clause "with protest" visibly on the face of the
draft;5 66 presentment for payment and notice of dishonor are
mandatory." 7 Argentina also permits the waiver of protest, but
this waiver does not free the holder from making presentment and
555. U.C.C. § 3-501(3).
556. Bills of Exchange Act, §§ 16, 46, 51(9).
557. Geneva Cheque Convention, art. 43.
558. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 46.
559. C6DIGO DE Commcio, art. 754 (El Salvador).
560. C6DIGO DE COMERCIo, art. 469 (Guatemala).
561. Id., art. 470.
562. C6DIGO DE CoMpaEcio, art. 452 (Venezuela).
563. Id., art. 454.
564. C6Dioo DR ComEaclo, art. 454 (Ecuador).
565. LEY DE CHEQUES, art. 41.
566. C6DIoo DE Co mwxo, art. 697 (Colombia).
567. Id., art. 707.
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giving notice of dishonor of the draft." 8 Where checks are in-
volved, the dishonor notation placed on the check by the drawee-




JJ. Unjust Enrichment Actions After the Statute of
Limitations Has Run
As stated in a preceeding section, the discharge of the party on
the instrument also discharges him/her on the underlying obliga-
tion in the United States. 7 This result seems quite fair when the
instrument is dishonored and the holder fails to notify the indorser
by midnight of the third business day following the holder's receipt
of notice of the dishonor.'5 The same result follows when the
tardy holder fails to present the instrument for payment until
more than seven days after the indorser negotiated the instrument
to the holder.574 So long as the indorser has no knowledge of insol-
vency proceedings instituted against the maker or drawer, he can
pay his debts with bad checks which his debtors gave him. 75 This
seems to be particularly unfair when the "bad check" is used to
purchase goods or real property. In this case, the bad check buyer
is enriched at the expense of the tardy seller.
The possibility of unjust enrichment also arises when a state
or country has a very short statute of limitations or prescription.
The problem also arises when the local law provides that any ac-
tion against a prior party lapses or is forefeited when the making
of protest is delayed beyond the prescribed limits. In brief, there
should be some kind of a legal escape valve which protects the dil-
atory holder by preventing the indorser from being unjustly en-
riched. This legal escape valve has been created in some Latin
American countries by the "unjust enrichment" action.
Among the Latin American countries discussed in this article,
it appears that Ecuador has the most complete articulation of an
"unjust enrichment" action in its Commercial Code. The code pro-
568. C6DIGo DE CoMcmio, Titulo X, Cap. VII, art. 50 (Argentina).
569. Id., Titulo XIII, Cap.IV, art. 38.
570. LEY GENERAL, art. 141.
571. Id., art. 190.
572. See supra p. 294.
573. U.C.C. §§ 3-502(1)(a), 3-508(2).
574. Id., § 3-503(2)(b).
575. Id., § 3-417(2)(e).
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vides that the holder of a bill of exchange loses his exchange action
against the drawer, the indorsers and other parties (with the ex-
ception of the acceptor) if the time for presentment and the giving
of protest has elapsed. The same code provision then states:
Nevertheless, in case of lapse (caducidad) or prescription the
exchange action shall subsist against the drawer who has not
made remittance to the drawee (provision) or against the drawer
or an indorser who has been unjustly enriched, as well as, in case
of prescription, against the acceptor who has received remit-
tance from the drawer (provision) or who has been unjustly en-
riched, which shall be resolved in the same action initiated for
the payment of the bill of exchange.
T5 7
The El Salvadorian unjust enrichment provision is much narrower
than the one in Ecuador:
The exchange action against the issuer being extinguished by
the lapse (caducidad) or by prescription, the holder of the nego-
tiable instrument which lacks the action against the latter, and
of exchange or causal action against other signatories, may de-
mand from the issuer the sum in which he has been enriched to
his [the holder] damage. This action prescribes in one year
counted from the day in which the exchange action prescripted
or lapsed.6"7
The Mexican$7 8 and Guatemalan'7 9 unjust enrichment rules closely
parallel the one in El Salvador. Argentina's rule tersely states that
"[t]he action of enrichment shall be prescribed in a year, counted
from the day in which the exchange action was lost." 8"
KK. Miscellaneous Concepts
This section deals with various concepts which, although in-
teresting, do not deserve treatment under separate sections.
1. JOINT AND ALTERNATIVE PAYEES
The UN Draft Convention provides that a bill or note may be
made payable to two or more payees, and if:
576. C6DIGO D CONRECIO, art. 461 (Ecuador).
577. CdDxGO DE Comz~clo, art. 649 (El Salvador).
578. LEY GENaaAL, art. 169.
579. C6D GO DE CoMmucio, art. 409 (Guatemala).
580. CDIoo DR COMERC1O, Titulo X, Cap. XII, art. 96 (Argentina).
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an instrument is payable to two or more payees in the alterna-
tive, it is payable to any one of them and any one of them in
possession of the instrument may exercise the rights of a Holder.
In any other case the instrument is payable to all of them and
the rights of a holder can only be exercised by all of them." '
This language closely resembles articles 3-116 of the UCC. For
some reason, however, one of the commentaries under the UN
Draft Convention directly conflicts with the comment under article
3-116. The UN Convention commentary states that where "an in-
strument is drawn or made payable to A and/or B, it is considered
to be payable to both A and B, and not any one of them. ' 582 In
contrast, the UCC comment states: "[if the instrument is payable
to 'A and/or B,' it is payable in the alternative to A, or to B, or to
A and B together, and it may be negotiated, enforced or discharged
accordingly." These differing views might indicate that the use of
the virgule ought to be avoided. 88
2. LIABILITY OF TRANSFERORS WHO DO NOT INDORSE
Under the UCC, "no person is liable on an instrument unless
his signature appears thereon. 58 4 Therefore, if persons transfer in-
struments under the blank indorsement of the payee without
themselves indorsing the paper, they incur no liability if the maker
or drawee (or prior parties) fails to pay the note or draft. In the
event of forgery, the transferor without indorsement "warrants to
his transferee"5 86 that there has not been any forgery. However, he
does not give any warranty to subsequent transferees. This seems
incongruous because the non-indorsing transferor does warrant
against prior forgeries to "a person who in good faith pays or ac-
cepts that" he has good title to the instrument and that he has no
knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is unautho-
rized.5 It is true that subsequent transferees may have difficulty
in ascertaining the identity of prior transferors without indorse-
ment, but payors may also have similar difficulties.
A much better approach has been advanced in the UN Draft
581. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 9(3).
582. Id., at commentary 6.
583. Dynalectron Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., - F.2d __ , 35 U.C.C. REP. SERv.
1548 (4th Cir. 1983).
584. U.C.C. § 3-401(1).
585. Id., § 3-417(2). Part of this hiatus is filled by § 4-207(2).
586. Id., § 3-417(1).
1983]
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
Convention: "[a]ny person who transfers an instrument by mere
delivery is liable to any holder subsequent to himself [emphasis
added] for any damages that such holder may suffer on account of
the fact that prior to such transfer 56 7 a signature on the instru-
ment was forged, the instrument was materially altered, a party
has a valid claim or defense against him or the bill was dishonored
by non-acceptance or non-payment. This liability extends only to
those holders who take without knowledge of the particular defect.
The commentary notes that liability under this rule is "off"
(doesn't arise from) the instrument, and thus presentment and
protest are not conditions precedent to such liability. Liability
"materializes the moment the instrument is transferred regardless
of its date of maturity."'"
3. TIME ALLOWED FOR ACCEPTANCE
The drawee, under the UCC, has the right to defer acceptance
without dishonor until the close of the next business day following
presentment." 9 This rule is paralleled in the Geneva Draft
Convention:
The drawee may demand that a bill shall be presented to him a
second time on the day after the first presentment. Parties in-
terested are not allowed to set up that this demand has not been
complied with unless this request is mentioned in the protest.
The holder is not obliged to surrender to the drawee a bill
presented for acceptance.'"
This provision has been adopted by Venezuela, e 1 Argentina 592 and
Ecuador,"93 but apparently not by the other countries surveyed in
this article.'" Under the UN Draft Convention, presentment for
acceptance must be made on or before the day of maturity,''5 while
presentment for payment must be made on the day of maturity or
587. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 41.
588. Id., at commentary 2.
589. U.C.C. § 3-506(1).
590. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 24.
591. C6DIGO DR CoMEsc1o, art. 432 (Venezuela).
592. C6n[Io DR CoMZpcio, Titulo X, Cap. III, art. 26 (Argentina).
593. C6DnO DR Commcio, art. 432 (Ecuador).
594. Parenthetically, the drawee in the Dominican Republic must accept a dishonor
within 24 hours after presentment. C6Dmo DR CoMERCl, art. 125 (published in C6DIGO DR
COMRCO DR LA RzPOBLCA DOMnaCANA (1983)).
595. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 47(e).
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on the business day which follows.519
4. DOCUMENTARY DRAFTS
The UCC describes a documentary draft as "any negotiable or
non-negotiable draft with accompanying documents, securities or
other papers to be delivered against honor of the draft."'" Other
sections of the UCC state that a bank presented with a documen-
tary draft under a letter of credit may defer honor until the close
of the third banking day following receipt of the documents and
may further defer honor if the presenter has expressly or impliedly
consented to this.8" Aside from a few other scattered references in
the UCC, the documentary draft is ignored. There is nothing
spelled out in articles 3 and 4 about the presenter's or holder's du-
ties under a documentary draft. It is suggested that the adoption
of the following (or similar) language into the UCC might be
helpful:
The insertion of the clauses: documents against acceptance or
documents against payment, or of the indications D/a or D/p in
the text of the bill of exchange to which there are accompanying
documents, shall oblige the holder of the bill of exchange not to
deliver the documents except through the means of the accept-
ance or the payment of the bill or exchange.5"
Mexico,6"0 Colombia,601 and El Salvador, 60 2 have rules which are
similar to this one.
5. "GRACE PERIOD" FOR PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT
Under the UCC, the holder of a draft or note must present it
for payment on the date it is due. If he/she fails to do so, he/she
will discharge indorsers unless he/she has a valid excuse for the
tardy presentment.103 If the presentment is due on a day which is
not a full business day for either the person making presentment
or the party to pay or accept, presentment is due on the next day
596. Id., art. 51(e).
597. U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(f).
598. Id., §§ 3-506, 5-112(l).
599. C6DIOO DE Coimcio, art. 450 (Guatemala).
600. LEY GENERAL, art. 89.
601. C6DIGO DE Coumcio, art. 679 (Colombia).
602. C6DIGO DE COMERCiO, art. 712 (El Salvador).
603. U.C.C. §§ 3-501, 3.502, 3-511.
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which is a full business day for both of the parties.'"
The UN Draft Convention again seems to the UCC since it
provides that presentment for payment must be made on "a busi-
ness day," and also that it must be presented upon maturity "or on
the business day which follows." 60s The Geneva Draft Convention
follows a more liberal approach: the holder must "present the bill
for payment either on the day in which it is payable or one of the
two business days which follow [emphasis added]."6 '
Mexico 607 and El Salvador60 8 seem to have anticipated the UN
Draft Convention. They require presentment upon the first busi-
ness day following a non-business day. Ecuador,"" Venezuela, 10
Argentina,611 and Guatemala1 2 follow the more generous Geneva
Draft Convention and allow for two days. Colombia seems to take
the most relaxed position and has a provision which states that the
draft must be presented "for its payment on the day of its matur-
ity or within the eight following calendar days." 1"
6. "ACCELERATION" OF MATURITY OF A DRAFT BECAUSE OF DEATH
OR BANKRUPTCY OF A PARTY
The following hypothetical problem seems unanswered by the
UCC: Assume that a draft is payable six months from date and
that three months prior to the date of maturity, the drawee be-
comes bankrupt (or dies). Does this bankruptcy (or death) acceler-
ate the maturity date of the draft so as to enable the holder to
demand payment from the drawer of indorsers? A lawyer in the
United States must investigate the federal bankruptcy laws and
the probate laws of the various states in order to answer these
questions. 1  Perhaps a better way has been articulated in
604. Id., § 3-503(3).
605. U.N. Draft Convention, art. 51(a) & (e).
606. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 38.
607. LEY GENERAL, art. 81.
608. C6DIvo DE COMERClO, art. 733 (El Salvador).
609. C6DIGo DE COMERCIO, art. 446 (Ecuador).
610. CODIGO DE COMEnCIO, art. 446 (Venezuela).
611. C6DvGo DE COMERCIO, Titulo X, Cap. VI, art. 463 (Argentina).
612. CODIO DE COMERCIO, art. 463 (Guatemala).
613. C6DIGo DE COMERCIO, art. 691 (Colombia).
614. U.C.C. § 3-511(3)(a) excuses presentment when the maker, acceptor or drawee of
any instrument (except a documentary draft) is either dead or in insolvency proceedings.
This selection also allows the holder recourse against other parties, but does not authorize
the maturation of the instrument before maturity. F.M. HART AND W.F. WILLIER, COMMER-
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Venezuela:
The holder may exercise his remedies and actions against the
indorsers, the drawer and others obligated:
Even before maturity,
In those cases of bankruptcy of the drawee, having accepted or
not, of suspension of his payments even in the case in which
there is no record of a judicial resolution, or by attachment of
his goods which makes the result (payment) impracticable or
fruitless.
In those cases of bankruptcy of the drawer of a bill which does
not require acceptance."1'
It appears that the Venezuelan provision was derived from ar-
ticle 43 of the Geneva Draft Convention with a few local
embellishments:
The holder may exercise his right of recourse against the endors-
ers, the drawer and the other parties liable:
Even before maturity;
(1) If there has been total or partial refusal to accept;
(2) In the event of the bankruptcy (faillite) of the drawee,
whether he has accepted or not, or in the event of a stop-
page of payment on his part, even when not declared by a
judgment, or where execution has been levied against his
goods without result;
(3) In the event of the bankruptcy (faillite) of the drawer of a
non-acceptable bill.61
In El Salvador, the bankruptcy of the drawee, his suspension
of making payments or his insolvency matures the bill of exchange,
and the holder can then exercise his rights on it."" Argentina'
and Ecuador"1 have adopted provisions with language which
closely resembles the Geneva-Venezuelan version. In Mexico, the
holder may bring suit even before the maturity of the bill when
CIAL PAPER, § 9.25 (1983).
615. C6DIGO DE Commcio, art. 451 (Venezuela).
616. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 43.
617. C6D]GO DE ComsRcio, art. 760 (El Salvador).
618. C6DIGO DE COMuRCIO, Titulo X, Cap. VII, art 47 (Argentina).
619. C6DIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 451 (Ecuador).
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either the drawee or the acceptor has been declared bankrupt or in
a state of insolvency.6 20 The language used in Mexico differs from
the language of the Geneva Draft Convention.
7. THE PAYOR BANK: WHAT PROCEDURES WHEN A FORGED CHECK
IS PRESENTED
Assume that a drawee bank is presented with a check for pay-
ment across the counter (or through the bank collection process,)
and the employee of the bank suspects that it has been forged or
altered, what does the bank do? It is, of course, obvious that the
bank should dishonor, but what does the bank do with the check
itself? The UCC remains strangely silent about this too often re-
curring problem. The problem is, however, nicely solved in El
Salvador:
If the bank notices errors or it has suspicions of fraud or of fal-
sity, it may retain the check giving immediate notice to the
drawer and it shall pay or not pay, according to what the drawer
directs. The delay may not exceed twenty-four hours. The bank
shall extend to the holder a record of the presented check which
remains in its possession. In this record it shall be recorded that
the check is non-transferable. 61
8. THE ILLITERATE PAYEE AND BANK PAYMENT
Although illiteracy may not be a major problem in the United
States, it is common enough to cause difficulties for banks. Unfor-
tunately, the UCC is silent as to an approved method of making
payment to an illiterate person. Again, the law in El Salvador is a
helpful model:
If a check has been drawn in favor of a person who does not
know how to or cannot sign, payment may be made to said per-
son only, who shall take it personally to the office of the bank
for collection; the indorsement shall be signed by a third person
at the request of the beneficiary, who shall in addition stamp his
thumb and fingerprints [on it]. If fingerprints cannot be taken,
the signature shall be made in the presence of an official of the
bank especially authorized for this purpose, who shall certify
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Guatemala provides that a person may sign on behalf of a per-
son who does not know how to or who cannot sign a negotiable
instrument and his signature "shall be authenticated by a notary




The author has been unable to discover any legal authority for the
use of fingerprints for the handling of checks in Guatemala. In
spite of this apparent lack of authorization, the author has ob-
served the use of fingerprints in the cashing of checks in banks in
that country.
9. INDORSEMENTS TO PLEDGEES
The UCC has no provisions governing the payee's or special
indorsee's indorsement to a pledgee which would prevent the
pledgee from violating its trust by indorsing to a holder in due
course. The Geneva Draft Convention does cover this problem:
When an endorsement contains the statements "value in se-
curity" ("valeur en garantie"), "value in pledge" ("valeur en
gage"), or any other statement implying a pledge, the holder
may exercise all the rights arising out of the bill of exchange,
but an endorsement by him has the effects only of an endorse-
ment by an agent.
The parties liable cannot set up against the holder defences
founded on their personal relations with the endorser, unless the
holder, in receiving the bill, has knowingly acted to the detri-
ment of the debtor. 1'
It appears that the draftsmen of the UN Draft Convention
have omitted any coverage of this pledgee indorsement; this is
strange in light of the wide adoption of the Geneva provision or of
similar language. For example, Guatemala 25 and Venezuela2 6 fol-
low the Geneva model with some language changes in language.
Argentina, 6 27 Colombia, 3 8 and Ecuador 2 ' closely track the Geneva
622. Id.
623. CODIGO DR Couaacio, art. 397 (Guatemala).
624. Geneva Draft Convention, art. 19.
625. C6DIGO DE CoMEcio, art. 428 (Guatemala).
626. C6DIGO DR ComEacio, art.427 (Venezuela).
627. C6DIGO DR COMEEClO, Titulo X, Cap. II, art. 20 (Argentina).
628. C6DIGO DE CONERC1o, art. 659 (Colombia).
629. C6DIGO DE Coummcio, art. 427 (Ecuador).
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wording. Mexico3 0 and El Salvadore"' follow similar concepts, but
add additional ideas and change the language used.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to make a comparative analysis of
the negotiable instrument laws of the United States with those of
eight foreign countries and two existing and to proposed interna-
tional conventions. It is the author's belief that some of these "for-
eign" concepts should be adopted in the United States. The differ-
ences in languages, customs, geography, etc., that divide us in
other legal areas are not significant in the area of negotiable instru-
ment laws. A more uniform approach to the issues which arise in
regard to negotiable instruments will make international business
transactions more predictable and consistent for those involved in
international trade.
630. LEY GENERAL, art. 36.
631. C6DIGO. iD ComERcio, art. 668 (El Salvador).
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